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The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), like many other regional organizations in Africa, have chosen regional 
integration to advance their various developmental goals. This is despite the many challenges 
that regional integration efforts within Southern Africa face. Alternatively, Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are redefining the trade relationship between the European 
Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group, which encompasses 
Southern African countries. Whereas the premise of the relationship had been the 
preferential, non-reciprocal treatment of the ACP countries, reciprocal trading relations will 
now be the definitive characteristic. The EU‟s rationale for redefining the relationship is 
based on the need to secure compatibility with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, as 
well to promote the development of the ACP countries. However, an onslaught of protest has 
beset the potential impact that reciprocity, the hallmark of the EPAs, will have on the ACP 
countries. Many authors have argued that there are alternative WTO compatible ways of 
continuing the preferential non-reciprocal treatment, which would not adversely impact the 
ACP countries. Consequently, this dissertation explores the relationship between the EPAs 
and regional integration within SACU and SADC. The central proposition of this paper is 
that EPAs will have an adverse impact on the organizations‟ regional integration efforts. It is 
argued that the most detrimental affect of the EPAs will be caused by the splintering of 
regional organizations, and the impact of reciprocity. In the course of presenting this 
argument this paper will also highlight the continued significance of regional integration, as 
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1.1 Background and the introduction of the central argument. 
 
In many respects, developing countries have sought regional integration (RI) as the device to 
propel them into a new era of development and economic prosperity.
1
 Within an African 
context, the importance of regrouping countries was further strengthened by the need to 
deconstruct the artificial borders that had been imposed, and thus became a post-colonialism 
mantra.
2
 The belief in the importance of integration and its‟ consequent pursuit has 
continued, despite its admittedly limited success on the continent, amidst what has been 
referred to as a „puzzling web of overlapping, contradictory and ineffective agreements.‟
3
  In 
this regard, Southern Africa is no exception. There is a litany of socio-economic challenges 
that the region faces. Consequently, regional organizations such as Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) continue to search for new approaches to RI to enable them to tackle these 




Simultaneously, the Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (referred to as 
EPAs) are being concluded between the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) and 
the European Union (EU). The EPAs will redefine the long-standing trade relationship 
between these two blocks. The impetus to redefine this trade relationship arises out of the 
need to secure WTO compatibility. The Lome Convention, which had previously regulated 
the trade relationship between the two blocks, violated WTO rules, and was under constant 
legal scrutiny. It is commonly understood that to ensure compatibility with the WTO rules, 
                                                 
1
 Dot Keet „The implications of the EU‟s proposed „Regional Economic Partnership Agreements‟ with respect 
to regional integration and development in Southern Africa‟ 16 available online at 
http://www.tni.org/archives/archives_keet_implications [accessed 1
st
 May 2009]. 
2
 Comas Ochieng „ EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements  and the Development question: Which way 
now?‟ (2007) 10 2 363 at 365 available online at http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002203/index.php  
[accessed 1 May 2009]. 
3
 Axel Borrman et al EU/ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Impact, Options and Prerequisites‟ (2005) 40 
3 Intereconomics 169.  
4















the relationship between the ACP countries and the EU will have to be re-established on the 
basis of reciprocal trading, as opposed to preferential treatment.
5
  
The emphasis on reciprocity has therefore received a barrage of criticism as the ACP 
group comprises of some of the world‟s poorest countries; 40 of the 77 countries are 
classified as a Least Developed Country (LDC).
6
  As a result, many ponder the impact that a 
reciprocal trading relationship will have on the developing countries‟ economies. The 
question that then arises is whether the WTO rules do not provide an alternative strategy 
which would allow the trading relationship to continue in a non-reciprocal form.  The issue as 
to whether or not there is scope within the WTO rules to continue to allow preferential access 
to the ACP countries has thus been the subject of much contention.  
The EPAs have consequently been the focus of much condemnation from many 
sectors. Some authors have alleged that that would „lead to the destruction of livelihoods‟.
7
In 
addition to this, many civil society groups have alleged that there are WTO compliant 




Ultimately, the EPAs will constitute a Free Trade Area (FTA) between the EU-ACP 
countries.
9
 This falls in step with the global trend towards trading in this form. A recent 
estimate by the WTO shows that more that 70 per cent of world trade is now being conducted 
through Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).
10
 The EPAs represent an FTA between two 
trading blocks with wildly divergent levels of development. In this, they are unique, as never 
before has the multilateral trading system played host to a North-South FTA between such 
economically diverse trading communities, covering such a wide spectrum of both trade, and 
non-trade matters. The EPAs are therefore important in that they will establish legal 
precedents for how future North-South relationships are structured. How to incorporate this 
trading relationship into WTO rules, while accounting for developing countries‟ economies, 
therefore poses tremendous challenges to WTO.  
                                                 
5
 C Ochieng (note 2) at 365. 
6
 The Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states „The ACP group‟ available online at: 
http://www.acpsec.org/en/about_us.htm  [accessed 20 May 2009]. 
7
 Julio Godoy „EU Stands to increase market share in Africa with EPAs‟ available online at 
http://ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=40936 [accessed 25 November 2009]. 
8
 D Keet (note 1) at 1.  
9
 A Free Trade Area is a form of a Regional Trade Agreement. This will be discussed in detail in chapter 2 
10
 Jayati Ghosh „North-South RTAs reinforce existing inequalities‟ available online at 











In light of the above, it is imperative for one to have a clear understanding of the 
possible impact that the EPAs will have on integration efforts within the region. 
Consequently, this dissertation investigates RI, EPAs and well as how they relate to 
integration efforts within the Southern African Customs Union and the Southern African 
Development Community. The central thrust of this paper argues that EPAs will have a 
detrimental effect on RI efforts within SACU and SADC. This is despite the fact that in 
principle, the EPAs should have bolstered RI. 
The focus on both SACU and SADC is not a terse decision. Both are poised to play 
substantive roles in any future RI efforts in the area. SACU is the oldest customs union in the 
world, having celebrated its 100
th
 year anniversary this year. Although only dealing with 
trade in goods, the organization has been lauded as one of the most advanced and successful 
examples of regional and formal co-operation on the African continent.
11
 Recognizing the 
potential of the organization, the SACU Council of Ministers has recently highlighted how 
the organization has come to represent more then „just a trade and revenue arrangement‟.
12
 
They have consequently called for a „roadmap to move towards an economic community and 
monetary union‟.
13
 Declarations such as this add weight to the contention of SACU being 
used as a vehicle to drive deeper regional integration in the area.
14
  Conversely SADC, 
though a relatively young organization encompasses all the Southern African countries.
15
 
Although  the organization only comprising of 14 out of the 47 Sub-Saharan African states, it 
accounts for half of the area‟s aggregate Gross Domestic Product.
16
  Furthermore, SADC has 
fully embraced the RI agenda. This is not only exhibited in terms of the SADC Trade 
Protocol, which recently led to the establishment of a  SADC FTA but additionally, the 
organization through, the Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISDP),  has specifically laid 
out a calculated plan for RI. In light of these factors, a close examined of any impediments to 
both SACU and SADC‟s RI efforts needs to take place. 
                                                 
11
 Peter Draper „Bigger SACU could lead the way‟ Available online: 
http://www.saiia.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:biggersacucouldleadtheway&cat
id=67:development-through-trade-opinion&Itemid=204 [accessed 20 April 2009]. 
12
 SACU Press Statement  „Outcome of the Special SACU Council of Ministers Meeting held on 17 September 




 P Draper (note 11) at 1. 
15
 The Southern African countries are Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
16
 International Security Studies „SADC RISDP‟ 












In order to pre-empt some possible criticisms, the following caveats are offered. 
Firstly, the objective of this paper is not to demonize the EPAs. In analysing the EPAs, there 
is a dire need to filter „the hyperbole from the reality‟.
17
 The EPAs should neither be regarded 
as either panacea, or plague for Southern Africa, a critique that can be equally levelled at both 
critics and supporters of the EPAs. To regard the EPAs as either is to gloss over a number of 
important advantages and disadvantages. The principle advantage is that previous trade 
arrangements that Southern Africa had with the EU was constantly under legal 
scrutiny.
18
Ensuring that the region has a WTO compliant trade regime with the EU would 
galvanize the legal status of the trading relationship out of its precarious position. This in turn 
would potentially aid in establishing market stability and attracting investment in the 
region.
19
 In addition to this the ACP countries under the EPAs have more favourable access 
to the EU, though the price of this improved access will be addressed in this paper. 
Nonetheless, there are two sides to the coin, both positive and negative aspects to the EPAs; 
this should not be lost sight of. The scope of this paper however is limited to exploring the 
negative impact that the EPAs will have on RI within SACU and SADC. 
Secondly, this paper is written mindful of the various, undeniable obstacles that 
SACU and SADC will face in their RI efforts. The EPAs are not accountable for pre-existing 
issues. However, it will be argued that that the EPAs have either exacerbated, or in some 
instances created new challenges.  
 There still exists much contention as to whether or not RI efforts are the most 
appropriate tool for African countries to use in pursuing their developmental needs. Authors 
have argued that the favourable conditions needed to secure the benefits from RI are not 
present.
20
 In light of this, it has been proposed that it would be more beneficial for the 
continent to pursue regional co-operation while only looking to RI as a long-term goal.
21
 
                                                 
17
 European Center for Development and Policy Management „The interim Economic Partnership Agreements 
between the EU and the African states: contents, challenges, and prospects‟ 14 available online at 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index2?readform&http://www.ecdpm.org 
[accessed on 3 January 2010]. 
18
 Bonpas Onguglo and Taisuke Ito „How to make EPAs WTO compatible? Reforming the rules on regional 
trade agreements‟  26 Discussion Paper No. 40 available online at  
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/vwPrint/04BE83528CC369ADC1256DA4004
AD303?Opendocument [accessed 7 October 2009]. 
19
 Louise Curran et al „The Economic Partnership Agreements: Rationale, Misconceptions, and non-trade 
aspects‟ 9 available online at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Knowledge/25120389-
EN-DRAFT-EPA-PAPER-WITH-LC-AND-DB-23-24-AUG-07-CLEAN.PDF [accessed 25th May 2009]. 
20
 Margret Lee „Regionalism in Africa: A part of the problem or part of the solution?‟1 available online at 
http://www.polis.sciencespobordeaux.fr/vol10ns/lee.pdf [accessed 18 October 2009].  
21












Although the above is an important argument, this dissertation is not premised on the efficacy 
of using RI to further developmental and economic objectives. Rather, it examines the de 
facto situation where RI structures continue to be the mechanism chosen by African leaders 
to propel the development of their countries. 
Furthermore, this paper will not attempt to look at each individual aspect of the EPAs 
which may have bearing for RI. Instead, a far more focused investigation will be undertaken. 
Therefore, only factors found to have the most pernicious impact on RI will be examined.  
As is the case with most research, this dissertation has a temporal cutoff date. 
Accordingly, no developments after January 2010 will be considered.  
This dissertation is documentary research based.  The primary resources that have been 
consulted are in journal articles, WTO agreements and interpretive guidelines, International 
treaties and declarations, textbooks, policy documents and newspaper articles This 
information was primarily found in academic libraries and the internet.  
1.2 Outline of paper  
The structure of the paper is as follows.  
Chapter 1 will consist of a background discussion of the various issues, as well as an 
introduction of the central argument of the paper. 
Chapter 2 is a general overview of RI. The purpose of this chapter will be to firstly, 
give an understanding of what RI is, and how it relates to other concepts such as regionalism 
and regional co-operation. The focus will then turn to an analysis of some of the most salient 
benefits and disadvantages of RI.  In the subsequent section the African context is examined. 
This section will investigate why the continent and consequently, Southern Africa appears to 
be afflicted by „integration fever‟. In examining this issue the historical significance of RI on 
the continent is revealed. The objective of this section is to provide insight into why RI 
continues to be held in high esteem, despite the fact that it has been fraught with a plethora of 
problems, and has failed to deliver the expected economic and developmental aspirations.   
Chapter 3 assesses the framework of the EPAs within the context of SACU and 
SADC. This chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first part, an assessment of the 
historical context of the various organizations pertinent to this dissertation, namely SACU, 
SADC and EU-ACP countries takes place. Consequently, in the first section of this chapter 











of the trade relationship between the EU and the ACP countries, from the Lome Agreement 
through to the EPAs. This historical overview is important in that it will provide insight on 
the role of RI within SACU and SADC. It will also display to what extent legal commitments 
have been undertaken by these regional organizations to achieve this goal. 
The second part of this chapter will constitute an examination of the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement, coupled with an outline of the negotiating process leading to signing 
of the interim Economic Partnership Agreement. This will take place to shed light on the fact 
that in principle, the pillars of the EPAs had been designed in such a way as to strengthen RI 
efforts, although this would prove to not be the case. To provide a more holistic assessment 
of the regional organizations‟ trade relationship with the EU, an outline of the Trade 
Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA), South Africa‟s FTA with the EU, will 
be given. In addition to this, a consideration of the negotiations will reveal the emergence of 
contentious issues, which would later prove to have a detrimental impact on RI.  
A study of the legal milieu takes place in chapter 4. Accordingly, Article XXIV of 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), the Enabling clause, and a Generalised and Non Reciprocal System of Trade 
Preferences for Developing Countries (GSP) in all its attenuated forms, will be expounded 
upon. Following this, a review of the veracity of some of the arguments proposing a legally 
compliant alternative to the EPAs takes place. In examining legal alternatives, this chapter 
will also investigate the possible impact that the Doha Development round of negotiations 
may have.  
The objective of this chapter is to understand why the preferential trade relationship 
between the EU-ACP countries was found not to be WTO compatible. In addition to this, the 
chapter addresses what alternatives to the EPAs would not only look like, but the possible 
ramifications that it would have for the market access of the ACP countries. 
Mindful of the above considerations, chapter 5 will examine some of the most cogent 
ways that EPAs will affect the integration process. These will be assessed from two 
perspectives; the splintering of regional organizations, and the impact of reciprocity.  
Chapter 6 reflects on the many varied issues that have been raised in earlier sections 
then proceeds to draw the various themes together, and then finally recommendations and 













GENERAL OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION  
In the first part of this chapter, various concepts such as regionalism, RI and regional 
cooperation will be discussed and defined. This will then be followed by a more detailed 
examination of regional integration, the different theories surrounding it, as well as the 
potential advantages and disadvantages. The focus then turns to RI within an African context 
as its particular significance on the continent is examined.  
2.1 Definitions and clarifications 
22
 
The literature on RI and regionalism is undoubtedly voluminous. However, theoretically 
these areas remain difficult terrain to manoeuvre. One of the factors contributing to this is 
that a degree of ambiguity continues to be attached to various concepts. This arises because 
authors do not define terms in an identical way. This, in turn leads to the emergence of „gray 
areas‟ which are typically displayed by the manner in which different authors treat 
regionalism, regional co-operation, and regional integration.
23
  
In light of the above, in order to mitigate against any arising confusion the following 
definitions will be adopted. Firstly, regionalism will be understood as the blanket term 
relating to all „efforts [made] by a group of nations to enhance economic, political or cultural 
interaction‟.
24
 This definition therefore embraces both [my emphasis] efforts made towards 
RI and regional co-operation.  
Alternatively, regional co-operation and RI will be understood as two distinctive 
concepts. The principle difficulty with using the terms synonymously is that „it creates the 
impression that any two countries that are co-operating are engaged in a process that will 
eventually led to integration‟.
25
 This, is however not the case as on many occasions states 
collaborating on a particular effort would have no intention of ultimately integrating their 
economies.
26
 It is important to bear in mind that the impetus that gives rise to regionalism, 
regional co-operation and RI may be the same.  
                                                 
22
 R Mukamunana and K Moeti „Challenges of regional integration in Africa: Policy and administrative 
implications‟ 2005 Journal of Public Administration 90 at 91 available online at 
http://repository.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/4746/1/Mukamunana_Challenges%282005%29.pdf [accessed 
28 November 2009]. 
23
 Supra.  
24
 M Lee (note 20)at 1.  
25
 Henry Mutai Compliance with international trade obligations, The Common Market for Eastern Africa (2007) 
32. 
26











Having clarified the definitions, the following section undertakes a more detailed 
analysis of regionalism, regional co-operation and regional integration. This is followed by an 
outline of the approaches to RI. 
2.1.1 Regionalism 
It is commonly accepted that there have been at least two waves of regionalism.
27
 The first 
wave took place in the 1950s and was initiated by the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. This organization was the forerunner to the European 
Union.
28
 In order to gain trade benefits with the EEC, developing countries proceeded to 
establish their own regional structures. However, most of these efforts, particularly within 
developing countries failed as regionalism lost significance as the multi-lateral trading 
system, which together with its emphasis on trade liberalization, gained momentum.
29
 
The second wave of regionalism took place from the 1970s. It was spurred by the 
stagnant Uruguay round of negotiations, and the consequent dissatisfaction with the multi-
lateral trading system.
30
 This wave of regionalism took place on a far larger basis.  Not only 
was there a resurgence of many old agreements such as Mercosur
31
, but the USA, who had 
prior to this been an ardent critic of regionalism, embraced it in the formation of the North 
Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA).
32
 In addition to this, within a developing country context 
there was an emergence of North-South regional efforts.   
While only 125 RTAs were notified during the GATT years. Since the establishment 
of WTO up to April 2002, a further 125 new RTAs have been notified. This represents an 
average of 15 notifications annually. 
33
 This proliferation of RTAs has led many authors to 
believe that a third wave of regionalism is currently under way. This third wave of 
regionalism is commonly referred to as „open regionalism‟. It is novel in that as opposed to 
                                                 
27
 Marvin Leshaba „A critical analysis of Africa‟s efforts at regional integration‟ Center for Policy Studies 
Policy Briefing 30 at 2. 
28
 Mills Soko „Regionalism and the WTO: opportunities and dangers for Africa ‟ (2004) 11 2 South African 
Journal of International Affairs 31 at 31.  
29
 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations „Executive summary on regional integration‟ 4 
available online at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/004/Y4793E/y4793e03.htm [accessed 18 October 2009].  
30
 M Soko (note 28) at 31.  
31
 Mercosur is the regional trading agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay  
32
 Food and Agricultural Organization (note 29) at 5. 
33
 Peter Sutherland „The future of the WTO: addressing the institutional challenges in a new millennium‟ 
21Report by the Consultative Board to the former Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi available online at 











shielding countries from the global economy as had previously occured, this third wave of 
regionalism directs its efforts towards „engaging with globalisation and the global market‟.
34
  
2.1.2 Regional co-operation 
Regional co-operation refers to „a collaborative venture between two or more partners, with 
common interests in a given issue‟.
35
 Such initiatives may be ad-hoc and take place on a far 
more limited basis and as opposed to RI efforts, do not require long-term commitment.
36
   
What distinguishes regional co-operation from other related concepts is its inherent 
flexibility. Countries have the freedom to identify priority areas without being subject to the 
pressure to liberalize trade, as is the case with many integration models.
37
 Although it does 
not necessarily [my emphasis] lead to RI, it should be noted that enhanced cooperation 
between countries could act as a stimulus for RI.
38
 
2.1.3 Regional integration  
At its most basic, RI arrangement is a preferential agreement between countries who agree to 
reduce both economic and non-economic barriers to trade.
39
 Authors offer varying definitions 
such as Harloow who defines RI as  
a process by which a group of nation states voluntarily 
and in various degrees have access to each other‟s markets and 
establish mechanisms and techniques that minimize conflicts 
and maximize internal and external economic , political, and 
social and cultural benefits of their interaction.
40
  
Alternatively, Asante states that RI is  
a process whereby two or more countries in a particular 
area join together to pursue common policies and objectives in 
matters of general economic development in particular economic 




                                                 
34
 Hubert René Schillinger „Revisiting regionalism in Southern Africa‟ 11 available online at 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/namibia/05258.pdf [accessed 21 January 2010].  
35
 M Lee (note 20) at 3.  
36
 Steven Radelet „Regional integration  and Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Are Formal Trade Agreements 
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However, it is submitted that although the above definitions vary, at their core they 
embrace the same essential elements. Both describe a process whereby countries merge 
certain aspects of their economies together. This convergence then leads to positive spin offs 
effects, which although originating with the economic field have a „domino effect‟ and thus 
reverberate throughout many other areas.  
2.2 Approaches to Regional Integration  
When analysing RI there is an overwhelming number of different approaches that have been 
adopted within the literature. In the following section only two approaches will be examined; 
the market integration model and the developmental integration model. These two models 
have been chosen because they served as the basis for many other approaches to RI, but they 
are furthermore the most pertinent to SACU and SADC. 
2.2.1 Market integration  
Market integration „is [a] linear progression of [the various] degrees of integration‟
42
 It is 
premised on the belief that „intensified regional trade promotes economic development‟.
43
  
The chief architects of the discourse relating to market integration are Balassa and Viner.
44
 
Viner‟s work in this area falls directly within the sphere of neoclassical free-trade theory, 
which advocates for free trade, unconstrained by regional trade arrangements.
45
  Balassa‟s 
work in 1960s was built on Viner‟s earlier framework.  
Market integration theory distinguishes between the following phases of integration.  
a) Free Trade Area: Preferential trade area were a group of countries either lower or 
eliminate both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade amongst themselves. These are however, 
still maintained against the rest of the world.
46
  
 b) A Customs Union is preferential arrangements where not only there are no tariffs 
between member states, but the group collectively adopts a common external tariff (CET) in 
relation to all non-member countries.
47
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c)  A Common Market embodies the characteristics of a customs union, but 
furthermore provides for the free flow of all the factors of production.
48
 
d) An Economic Union occurs when all the features of a common market 
accompanied by the the harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies.
49
 
e) A Political Union is the most advanced form of integration within this model. A 
political union embodies all the features of an economic union. The distinguishing factor 
between the two is that monetary and fiscal policies are not simply harmonized, but unified.
50
 
This requires the adoption of a common market and the creation of a supra-national body 
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It is important to note that although in terms of the theory, the different forms of 
integration are easily identifiable each with its own discernable characteristics; de facto the 
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situation is far more complicated.  Many integration arrangements will display overlapping 
characteristics falling in between stages while secondly, in other instances „titles will often be 
aspirational‟
52
 rather then describing a particular phase of integration. 
2.2.2 Development integration 
Development integration arose in response to the problems associated with the market 
integration model. Developmental integration is premised on the belief that „for regional 
economic integration to work, it must first and foremost focus on equitable regional 
development‟.
53
 To achieve this, development integration required significant political co-
operation and made provision for large-scale state intervention; therefore rejected the more 
laissez faire approaches to RI. Rather then prioritising the economic sector, developmental 
integration looked to political and administrative co-operation.
54
The governments of 
respective countries‟ are tasked with the promotion of trade co-operation, harmonization of 
administration as well as ensuring the equal distribution of trade benefits.
55
 
 Despite the stated objectives, this model proved to be too difficult to implement as it 
required a great deal of political commitment from member states.
56
 
The first part of this chapter began in a theoretical manner as various theories, 
definitions and approaches were examined. This took place in order to firstly, provide the 
historical context to how RI has emerged. An examination of the two most commonly 
adopted approaches to RI followed this. This has bearing to the central argument as the 
market integration and development integration strategies are the most salient to the RI 
initiatives of SACU and SADC. The SACU is a customs union as understood in terms of 
market integration approach. Although the subsequent investigation of SACU will reveal that 
the organization bypassed the earlier phase of FTA. Alternatively, SADC has utilized both 
approaches in its experience with RI. The organization had originally embraced more of a 
developmental approach but in recent history has aligned its RI strategy in term of the market 
integration approach. A clear understanding of these approaches and how they relate to 
SACU and SADC will allow the impact of EPAs on the organizations‟ RI efforts to be much 
easily examined. 
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2.3 Advantages of Regional Integration 
There are a number of potential benefits that can be gained from RI. These range over a wide 
spectrum encompassing political, economic and social and aspects. The following section 
examines these.   
Perhaps the most obvious benefit that a country can gain from RI is the benefits 
associated with trading as a larger block. The creation of a larger market allows countries to 
benefit from economies of scale, as they pool together limited resources.
57
 In addition to this, 
RI further allows countries to re-emerge on the global market not as individual states but 
rather as larger fortified economies therefore benefiting from increased bargaining power in 
negotiations.
58
  RI also acts as a stimulus for a number of other benefits. For example, the 
increased cooperation between countries can potentially lead to greater political stability and 
more effective conflict resolution efforts as trust begins to build between neighbouring 
countries.
59
 Greater political stability in turn is a draw card for Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), which can then aid in knowledge and technological transfers.
60
 Moreover, RI 
agreements may also help in „locking in‟ political and economic reforms. This rings 
especially true when the is a supervisory mechanism with strong sanctions imposed for non-
compliance. A RI agreement lauded for its supervisory role is the EU.
61
 
Viner‟s classic treatise on customs union usually serves as the starting point when 
examining the possible welfare effects of RI. Prior to Viner‟s work, it had been assumed that 
any steps towards liberalizing trade would be welfare enhancing.
62
 This fallacy was however, 
debunked when Viner examined the welfare distorting effect which could be created by 
customs union.
63
   
Viner proposed that RTAs could either have trade creating or trade diverting effects. 
Trade creation occurs when, as a result of the formation of the arrangement, trade barrier are 
reduced and there is a consequent increase in trade flows.
64
  Conversely, trade diversion 
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occurs when the formation of a RTA leads to the production of a good moving from a more 
efficient to a less efficient producer.
65
 When this occurs, countries within the agreement 
purchase a product „from a higher cost sources within the agreement, solely because of their 
tariff advantage over the lower cost sources outside the agreement‟.
66
 Therefore in terms of 
Viner‟s analysis, in principle, the welfare effects of a customs union were ambiguous.
67
 
However, where trade creation trumps trade diversion positive welfare gains result. 
Ultimately, the impact on an individual country will be determined by its particular 
circumstances which would then have to be empirically determined.
68
 
Another aspect, which may determine the ultimate welfare effects of RI, is the level of 
market liberalization in a specific country. Where a country has a relatively liberalized 
economy, the costs of integration are reduced, and there is a greater likelihood of trade 
creation trumping trade diversion.
69
 
Market integration theory put forward a different perspective in explaining the 
welfare impact that RI may have. The theory postulates that static and dynamic gains from 
trade as one of the central benefits.
 70
 Dynamic gains from RI occur when „as a result of intra-
regional trade liberalization there is increased output and productivity effects‟.
71
 Static gains 
from trade are determined by the relative sizes of trade creation, trade diversion and resource 
allocation.
 72
 Dynamic gains from trade are generally larger then static gains, however they 
only accrue in the long run.
73
 They include economics of scale, the possible stimulation of 
investment, the more efficient allocation of resources and increased competitiveness. The 
increase in competitiveness acts as a catalyst for another economic benefit, as producers 
continuously strive to produce a better product, the desire to continuously innovate facilitates 
steps into research and development, creating new knowledge and leading to better quality 
products at lower prices.
74
  Dynamic efficiency therefore accounts for the processes whereby 
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 One criticism that has been made of RTA between developing countries, or so called 
„South-South‟ RTA, has been that such agreements rarely exhibit the preconditions necessary 
to benefit from trade.
76
  For example, developing countries, particularly those located in the 
same geographically areas often have a comparative advantage in the production of identical 
goods.
77
 In such an instance, there is little impetus to trade. Conversely, North-South RTAs 
are able to overcome these challenges. Firstly, countries within a North-South RTA generally 
have a comparative advantage in the production of different goods; this creates a basis for 
trade. In addition to this though, these types of RTA tend to experience lower costs from 
trade diversion. Beyond this, there is a higher possibility that policy reforms will be „locked 
in‟ through agreements. South trading partners also stand to benefit from greater potential for 
technology and knowledge transfers.
78
 The recent proliferation of North-South RTAs will 
therefore possibly assist developing countries in harvesting the gains from RI. This is another 
factor contributing to the resurgence of the „third wave of regionalism‟.  
2.4 Disadvantages of Regional Integration  
As countries liberalize their economies they lose tariff income, which in the ordinary course 
of events would have contributed to government revenue. Countries such as Lesotho and 
Swaziland are endemically dependent on tariff income, which forms a substantial part of 
government revenue. For example, tariff income accounts for more then 60 per cent of 
government revenue in Lesotho, while in Swaziland it accounts for up to 70 per cent of 
government revenue.
79
 If upon liberalizing such countries are unable to diversify their income 
basis, there would potentially be crippling ramifications.
80
 
Another potential drawback to RI is that within the arrangement there may be 
instances of polarised growth.
81
 For example, the larger more developed countries are most 
likely to gain the benefits of RI as opposed to their less developed counterparts.
82
 This creates 
„winners and losers‟ of RI and reneges the very reason that many developing countries enter 
RI agreements. This may additionally lead to tensions developing between the various 
members. This was one of the pinnacle reasons that contributed to the collapse of the EAC in 
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An instance in which the emergence of „winners and losers‟ within an RTA can be 
seen is in terms of the „hub‟ and „spoke‟ effect. This occurs when an RTA is created between 
much a more developed country on one hand, and a number of smaller countries on the other. 
The larger country is the „hub‟, while the smaller countries are the „spokes‟. The hub, benefits 
from free access to all markets. On the other hand, the „spoke‟ countries only have free access 
to the hub market. This “hub-and-spoke” effect increases the incentive for exporters to invest 
in the „hub‟ country, rather than in the „spokes‟.
84
 
The issue of polarised growth can be overcome by employing some form of 
compensation mechanism. However, creating and maintaining such a mechanism is an 
onerous undertaking, from both a policy, and an administrative perspective. To date, SACU 
is the only African RTAs that has managed to successful devise, and maintain a 
compensation mechanism.
85
 SACU compensates the BNLS states for being in a customs 
union with South Africa, which is the economic powerhouse in the region.
86
 This 
compensation mechanism is however not without many challenges. A more comprehensive 
analysis of this will take place in the subsequent chapter.  
Another administrative challenge incurred in the structuring of RTAs is rules of 
Origin (ROO)
87
. These can be overly complex and inconsistent.
88
 For example, some RTAs 
may require that there is certain degree of transformation while others call for a certain 
degree of „local value‟ component.
89
 
In many countries, the preconditions that are necessary to gain the benefits from RI 
are rarely present. For example, the market integration approach, as is generally the case with 
a number of other economic models, is premised on a number of assumptions. These include 
full employment, disregarding adjustment and transportation costs, and trade within each 
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country is taken as perfectly competitive.
90
  Theoretical assumptions are far removed from 
prevailing conditions. 
From the above discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of RI, the following 
comments can be made. The potential benefits to RI would help alleviate many of problems 
faced by developing countries. This explains the emergence of RI as a primary economic 
tool.
91
 It is therefore clear that the pursuit of RI is not an end itself, but rather because of its 
potential to capitulate countries into a new era of development.92 This belief has reverberated 
throughout many other areas such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
 93
 Looking particularly 
within a Southern African context, the advantages of RI appear tailor-made to address the 
regions‟ various challenges. Such as limited resources, small markets, insufficient bargaining 
power within trade negotiations, and uncompetitive products. This, yet again underscores the 
appeal for RI within both SACU and SADC.  
That being said though, the disadvantages of  RI show that there are a number of 
pitfalls that countries may encounter in their quest for RI, which in themselves, may lead to a 
new set of problems.  
2.5 Regional integration within an African context
94
  
The following section examines the particular relationship that has emerged between Africa 
and RI, and the subsequent implications. 
The pre-eminence that has been given to regionalism on the African continent has 
stimulated a wealth of analysis and commentaries. Throughout the various exposés a 
common strain of argument can be traced; being that regionalism within Africa had a twin 
purpose. On one hand it was pursed as a vehicle for economic development, as was the case 
with a number of other developing countries. On the other hand, it became woven into the 
political ideology of Pan-Africanism.
95
 Pan-Africanism was a movement that constituted both 
a retaliatory measure against the impact of colonial powers, while also calling on the 
continent‟s sense of shared political history and ideology.
96
 Regionalism in this regard 
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became „an articulation of continental identity‟.
97
 Kwame Nkrumah, one of the great 
architects of the movement, aptly captured the promise that regionalism held for the continent 
at the time in the following statement „… So long as we remain disunited, so long as we are 




The promise that regionalism was perceived to hold for the continent heralded, what 
would be the beginning of a long, and tumultuous relationship which would later involve 
organizations such as SADC. 
In chronologically order, the most significant treaties and declarations dealing with  
regionalism are outlined. 
The All African People‟s Conference was held in 1958 in Ghana. This conference 
cemented that use of regionalism as a strategy for fostering economic and political 
development.
99
 This was then followed in 1963 by the establishment of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU). The Charter identified regionalism as the backbone for African 
Unity.
100
 In the charter, states committed themselves to „coordinate and harmonize their 
general policies‟.
101
   
The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) established in 1980, was regarded as a major coup 
for the continent.  The LPA was drafted in recognition of the continent‟s dismal economic 
performance, and was touted to lead the effort in an African economic recovery plan.
102
 It is 
generally considered to be the first African led development policy on the continent. It was 
comprehensive in its scope, covering an array of issues. At its core was the belief in the 
„collective development through regional integration‟.
103
 It was altogether an ambitious 
initiative which set out to establish an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2000.
104
  The 
objectives of the LPA had emerged at the same time at the Structural Adjustment Program 
supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These measures 
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supported by the „Brentton Woods‟ institutions gained supremacy over the LPA and its 
objectives, were disregard.
105  
The next momentous action taken to advance regionalism was the Treaty establishing 
the African Economic Community, more commonly referred to as the „Abuja Treaty‟, was 
signed in 1991.
106
 The primary aim of the treaty was to create a framework for the 
development, mobilization and utilization of material resources in an effort to achieve 
continental self-sufficiency.
107
 This treaty provided a time line for the establishment of AEC. 
This would take place over 6 stages during a 34 year period.
108
 The phases that are laid out by 
the „Abuja Treaty reflect the market integration approach to RI identified earlier in this 
chapter. It was therefore envisaged that the AEC would move from an FTA, to a CU, 




To facilitate this objective, a number of existing RTAs ranging from all over the 
continent, where designated as Regional Economic Communities (REC) which would be the   
building blocks for the AEC.
110
The following RTAS were designated as building blocs: the 
Eastern Community of West African States, SADC, the Economic Community of Central 
African States, COMESA and the Arab Maghreb Union.
111
  
Despite these earlier efforts, initiatives on the continent soon began to lull. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Firstly, the OAU had largely been unified by the common goal of 
the abolishment of apartheid South Africa. Once this occurred, the organization‟s purpose 
appeared fuddled. The central problem was that there were a number of continental issues 
where there was little or no convergence between the members of the organization.
112
 
Examples of such instances include the disputes over Western Sahara and the invasion of 
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Benin and the Shaba rebellions.
113
 Secondly, there was a dearth of political commitment to RI 
efforts.
114
 This was to an extent demonstrated by the decision to adopt Structural Adjustment 
Programs as opposed to the LPA. In addition to this, the continent‟s earlier efforts at RI had 
largely been „inward looking‟ and had merely replicated import substation industrialization 
policies at a regional level.
115
 These, amongst a number of other challenges led to widespread 
consensus of the need to rethink RI efforts.
116
  
Around the dawn of the new millennium, interests in RI were reinvigorated as was 
first displayed by the Sirte Declaration. It identified that there was an „imperative need and a 
high sense of urgency to rekindle the aspirations of our peoples for stronger unity, solidarity 
and cohesion in a larger community of peoples transcending cultural, ideological, ethnic and 
national differences‟.
117
  It articulated the intention to establish the African, accelerate the 
creation of institution of AEC as well as „strengthening and consolidating REC‟ which were 
identified as mechanisms for achieving the objective of the AEC. 
118
 
The establishment of the Constitutive Act of the African Union then followed these 
efforts. This act fully incorporated the provisions of the Abuja Treaty. Its objectives included 
the need to „achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African counties and the peoples 
of Africa‟.
119
In order to facilitate these efforts the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD) was also adopted. NEPAD is the developmental framework for the continent, 
which has subsumed RI as one of its priority areas.
120
NEPAD is now recognised as one of the 
programs of the AU.
121
  
The Pan- African identity has been invigorated by a renewed interest in African 
renaissance. Albeit the context has changed as the fight for political freedom has been won, 
but the continent is now waging a struggle for its economic sovereignty.  
2.6 Challenges towards African integration  
Regional integration therefore presents a possible solution to many of the disadvantages 
endemic to many African countries. For this reason, it has been lauded as a panacea. Despite 
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such accolades, RI efforts on the continent in many respects have failed. There are various 
accounts by numerous authors who have identified reasons for the failure of regional 
integration on the continent. The following are the most cited. Firstly, RI efforts were not 
matched by the concomitant political will. In this regard, authors have bemoaned how RI on 
the continent has been visceral as opposed to rational and rhetorical as opposed to being real 
and setting out achievable targets.
122
 
The numerous, overlapping memberships to various organizations have also been 
highlighted as a crippling obstacle to RI in Africa. Presently, there are 14 REC on the 
continent. Membership to REC across the continent is divided in the following manner. 26 
countries are members of at least two arrangements, while 20 belong to three arrangements 
with DRC being a member of four.
123
 The overlapping membership‟s results in the 
duplication of efforts, and therefore exhausting already scant resources. It is possible to 
belong to more than one FTA the problem however is that countries are then faced with 
conflicting obligations such as differing liberalization schedules and ROO. This in turn 
requires that more comprehensive efforts be employed towards the harmonization of policies. 
This has led some to conclude that „the range of requirements, multiple customs procedures 
and paper work, [are] counter to trade liberalization goals of facilitating and simplifying 
trade‟.
124
This observation further lends merit to the proposal of utilising SACU as a vehicle 
for deeper integration. All SACU members simultaneously belong to SADC incorporating the 
two organizations would help mitigate the problem of overlapping memberships.  
Other factors identified as hindering RI efforts include low levels of development, 
economic and political instability; high economic disparities between the various countries; a 
lack of trade coordination; and the abnormally low levels of intra-regional trade.
125
  In 
addition to this, the reluctance by some countries to forgo tariff income and liberalize trade, 




Although many of the advantages outlined above have made RI appear particularly 
attractive to developing countries, within an African context the foray of dismal conditions 
have led to a particular [my emphasis] penchant for RI. These efforts are then only 
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galvanised by the Pan African ideology. Africa has therefore seen RI as its only hope and has 
continued to cling to it in the hope that it will aid the continent in overcoming its host of 
problems and allow it enter the world economy in a meaningful way, ending years of 
marginalization.   
In light of this, it is therefore imperative to critically examine any factor which poses 
to impact negatively on already fledgling RI agenda. It is within this context that the adverse 




































THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EPAS WITHIN SACU AND SADC 
 
3.1 Historical overview of SACU and SADC  
 
3.1.1 Southern African Customs Union (SACU)   
Although there is speculation that the union originated from an 1886 agreement, common 
consensus is that the organization was formed in 1910.
127
 The organization was established as 
a pragmatic solution to the de facto economic integration of four separate in colonial entities, 
namely the Union of South Africa and the three landlocked British protectorates of 
Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland (BLS).
128
 The 1910 
agreement represented a way of accommodating foreign trade and distributing the revenue 
generated from trade with the rest of the world.
129
 A customs territory was therefore 
established. There was a CET which was exercised in respect of all goods coming into 
SACU. Accompanying this was common pool and excise duties, as well as the complete 
mobility of goods which had been manufactured within the area.
130
 Instead of following the 
linear path of the market integration model discussed in chapter 2, SACU „short-circuited this 
process‟ emerging from the onset as a customs union.
131
The customs territory was however 
dominated by South Africa. The larger country was responsible for levying of customs, sales 
and excise duties from all the members. In addition to this South Africa was also responsible 
for the paying out of incomes.  This situation was carried through to the revised SACU 
agreement in 1969.  
The 1969 SACU agreement, negotiated after the BLS states had attained 
independence, represented the first opportunity the BLS states had to act as independent 
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 Consequently, some advances were made by the BLS states. These 
included the introduction of infant industry protection for the BLS countries and more 
equitable distribution of the revenue fund through a compensatory „surcharge‟. This 
compensatory measure was said to both compensate the BLS states for entering into a 
customs union with a much larger country as well as accounting for the loss of sovereignty in 
fiscal policies that they experienced.
133
  
Following this the Rand Monetary Agreement was concluded in terms of which the 
Rand would be maintained as legal tender within Lesotho and Swaziland, therefore 
establishing a Common Monetary Area (CMA), although provision was made for the 
individual currencies to still be used.
134
 The Rand Monetary Agreement later developed into 
the Multilateral Monetary Agreement.   In principle under this arrangement, despite the fact 
that given that currencies were pegged to the Rand, each country maintained its own 




SACU was not untainted by South Africa‟s apartheid policies.  However, the 
organization survived because the BLS countries were unwilling to relinquish the substantial 
revenues they derived from the revenue sharing formula.
136
   Therefore, despite the fact that 
the BLS states were opposed to the heinous race based policies, the National Party managed 
to use SACU to secure a measure of „political acquiescence‟.
137
 
Dissatisfaction over the 1969 agreement was expressed for many years. Despite this, 
it was only once South Africa had attained democracy that the SACU agreement was 
revisited again.
138
  Given that the organization still bore its „colonial tag‟, the African 
National Congress identified the renegotiation of the SACU agreement as its foremost 
priority for regional trade.
139
The 2002 SACU agreement therefore represents a trenchant 
departure from its predecessors. It is heralded as a victory for regional democracy, 
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transforming the organization from a body that had been de facto unilaterally administered by 
South Africa, to a democratic institution where all members are equal.
140
 Thus, SACU now 
operates in terms of newly established democratic institutional structures, which largely 
function on a consensus basis.
141
  
For the purpose of this paper, the most significant provisions of the agreement are the 
Article 2, Article 6, Article 31, Part 6 and Part 8 of the agreement. These are the sections, 
which would facilitate deeper RI. Article 2 addresses the objectives of the 2002 SACU 
agreement. The most pertinent objectives include, firstly economic development, this is 
identified as a central aim of the organization.
142
 Accordingly, its importance reverberates 
throughout the entire agreement. Related to this, Article 2 highlights the need for the 
integration of the SACU countries into the global economy.  
The admission of new members is dealt with in terms of Article 6; it provides that in 
order for there has been unanimous agreement by the council.
143
  Article 31 regulates trade 
relationships between member states and third parties.
144
 In terms of this article, member 
states are required to establish common negotiating strategies that are adopted by the Council. 
This measure was taken to ensure that SACU members would all begin to adopt more co-
coordinated trade policies.
145
 Furthermore, member states are prohibited from entering into 
preferential trade arrangements without the prior consent of member states.
146
  
Part 6 addresses the irksome issue of revenues sharing, and herein lies one of the most 
distinctive characteristics of the agreement. The system has been restructured into three parts: 
The Customs component; the Excise component; and the Development component.
147
 The 
Customs component will be distributed according to the level of „intra-SACU imports‟. This 
effectively means that the revenue system has maintained its‟ compensatory as the BNLS 
states are still compensated by South Africa for the trade benefits that flow to it as a result of 
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 The majority of the excise pool is distributed according to member states‟ 
GDPs. In this manner, it is said to be „distributionally neutral‟.
149
 The development 
component, the third constitutive part of the revenue system, is an attempt to address the 
disparities in the levels of development of the SACU membership. This component will be 
allocated according to differences in per capita income, although it is adjusted, the 
development component continues to maintain a very strong redistributive function.
150
   
Alternatively, Part 8 of the agreement calls for a harmonized approach to be adopted 
towards the development of policies within a number of sectors. The harmonization of 
policies is to take place in industrial development, the agricultural sector, competition law 
and regulation as well as unfair trade practices.
151
 Specifically, member states are enjoined to 
develop „common policies and strategies‟
152
 for industrial development; „ensure co-
coordinated development‟
153
 within the agricultural sector; „co-operation in relation to 
competition law and regulation‟ as well as calling on member states to „address unfair trade 
practices‟ between member states.
154
 
 Despite embracing a democratic model SACU still faces many challenges. It remains 
to be seen whether it will be possible to adopt a consensus based model when South Africa 
contributes over 95 per cent of SACU‟s GDP.
155
  Would the BNLS states be able to stand 
their ground and not feel compelled to give into South Africa‟s interests? The divergence in 
the levels of development between South Africa and the BNLS means that they are 
influenced by different economic and policy considerations.
156
  
  Secondly, while it is understood that the 2002 SACU agreement represents a 
„framework agreement‟ eight years later not enough has been done to present a more 
comprehensive plan. This is particularly the case if one looks at the harmonization of 
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policies. Although from Part 8 is unclear how the diverging levels of harmonization required 
in the various sections will be distinguished.
157
  
Finally, one of the most challenging issues is the revenue sharing formula. 
Currently, the Lesotho and Swaziland government are severely dependent on the 
income from the revenue sharing formula, as 60 per cent of Lesotho‟s and up to70 per 
cent of Swaziland total government income accrues from SACU.
158
 For Namibia, the 
figure is less substantial standing at 41 per cent and for Botswana at 20 per cent.
159
  The 
gradual lowering of tariffs is a reality. This takes place not only through commitments 
to multilateral trade liberalization but, is further given effect to by RTAs such as the 
EPA. As tariffs are progressively lowered, the size of the customs pool will also shrink.  
In addition to this, there have been firm indications that South Africa is no longer 
willing to „carry‟ the BNLS states. For example, in October 2009 the mini-South African 
budget had already estimated that customs and excise receipts would drop by roughly 20% 
compared with 2008.
160
 Moreover, South Africa‟s newly established Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation may seek to administer an aid component in the 
future. The most likely source of funding has been identified as SACU transfers.
161
Even if 
this was not to the case, it is important that the BNLS realize that South Africa cannot 
indefinitely subsidize them at current levels.
162
 
In this regard, Colin McCarthy states that „the future of customs as a source of 
revenue is not rosy‟.
163
 This has been acknowledged by the SACU members who have stated 
that „in order to promote long term economic growth they need to move towards source of 
income other then SACU revenue pool and advance their fiscal reform processes‟.
164
 
However, significant efforts in this regard have not yet materialized.  
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On a more positive note, in terms of the new revenue sharing formula South Africa is 
no longer the residual claimant. This makes it easier for the SACU membership to be 
expanded. This is because an expanded membership, in the absence of a guaranteed revenue 




3.1.2 Southern African Development Community  
The predecessor to SADC was the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC). The organization was established by the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration. The 
reason de entre for SADCC was the shared goal by the „frontline states‟ to oppose the 
apartheid regime. 
166
 Consequently, its aims were the following; reducing the economic 
dependence of the region on South Africa; promoting regional integration; and securing 
international support for its economic liberation plan.
167
In this manner, SADCC was able to 
present a united front of the Southern African countries against apartheid South Africa. The 
gradual demise of apartheid policies in a manner analogous to the AU, removed the „main 
political rationale‟
168
 which formed the basis of SADCC. There was therefore a need to 
restructure the organization.  
The establishment of SADC transformed the organization from a „loose association 
into a legally binding arrangement‟, providing a legal framework for co-operation amongst 
member states.
169
 Currently, the organization has a membership of 14 countries.  
It has been argued that SADCC had originally rejected the market integration 
approach and its subscription to „neoliberal principles of free trade‟
170
; as opposed to 
focusing on trade, the organization placed more emphasis on „promoting production and 
adopting a development integration approach to cooperation‟.
171
  However, the birth of 
SADC brought with it a change in strategic direction. Consequently, the organization became 
more identifiable with the „dirigiste approach‟ to RI.
172
 This approach incorporates the 
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„promotion of industrial development; while simultaneously working towards the „deepening 
of economic integration and the facilitation of intra-regional trade‟.
173
 It therefore 
accommodates different levels of development within the organization.
174
 In this manner, it is 
a hybrid of the market and the development approaches to RI. Within the context of SADC, 
the use of the „dirgiste approach‟ is exhibited by the organizations objective to establish a 
framework of co-operation which provides for  
deeper economic cooperation and integration, on the basis of balance, 
equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and 




 In order to facilitate these objectives, the organization assigned designated areas to be 
the subject of 22 separate legal instruments referred to as protocols. Although initially, the 
different protocols had been administered by the individual states, there were delays in 
implementation. In order to facilitate implementation the protocols were then divided into 
different directorates which are managed by the SADC secretariat in Gaborone.
176
  
The SADC Trade Protocol was concluded in 1996. The Protocol is one of SADC‟s 
most important legal instruments, and is further testament of the organization embracing 
more of a free market approach.  The main objective of the Trade Protocol is to „further 
liberalize intra -regional trade- in goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually equitable 
and beneficial trade arrangements‟ and „to establish a free trade area for the SADC region‟.
177
 
In relation to this paper, the most important provisions of the Trade Protocol, being those that 
in some manner affect RI efforts are the following. Firstly, part 2 addresses the elimination of 
barriers to intra SACU trade. It provides that the elimination of barriers to trade shall take 
place within 8 years of the protocol.
178
  Article 14 also calls upon member states to take 




Part 6 addresses some new generation trade issues, and consequently covers trade in 
services, intellectual property rights and competition policy. More specifically, Article 23 
addresses trade in services recognizing the importance of this sector and furthermore 
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undertaking to implement the GATS mandate to liberalize the sector.
180
 Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) is covered by Article 24.
181
 In terms of the Article, there is an undertaking to 
„adopt policies and implement measures‟ within the community to protect IPR as mandated 
by TRIPS. Alternatively, Article 25 deals with competition policy; it contains an undertaking 
to prohibit unfair practices and promote competition.
182
 Unlike the SACU Agreement though, 
part 6 does not make provision for common positions to be established in these areas. 
Part 8 governs trade relations among member states and third countries. In dealing 
with this, Article 27 permits member states to maintain RTAs that were in place when the 
protocol was entered into.  There is however, a caveat to this, members who are party to 
existing arrangements will be required to review them „with a view to attaining the objectives 
of this protocol‟.
183
 Over and above this member states are allowed to enter into new 
arrangements as long as „they are not inconsistent with the objectives of the protocol.‟
184
 The 
co-ordination of trade policies is addressed in Article 29. It calls for member states to „co-
ordinate their trade policies and negotiating positions in respect of relations with third 
countries and international organizations as provided for in Article XXIV of the treaty‟ this is 
to take place in order to further the objectives of the protocol.‟
185
 
In accordance with the Trade Protocol in August 2008, the SADC FTA was launched 
between eleven of the fourteen members of SADC.
186
 Therefore, from this date, producers 
and consumers have paid significantly reduced tariffs on 85% of all trade on goods between 
the eleven countries.
187
 The FTA is a coup for the organization and demonstrates SADC‟s 
continued efforts to foster deeper RI efforts, accelerate economic growth and reduce 
poverty.
188
 According to the „ambitious‟ roadmap, a customs union would then follow by 
2012, this would then become a common market in 2015. This would cumulate in the 
establishment of a political union accompanied by one central bank with a single currency by 
2016.  
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Another indication of how SADC has employed RI is the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). This is SADC‟s strategy for socio-economic 
development. It is  
designed to provide strategic direction with respect to SADC programs, projects 
and activities outlines the necessary conditions that should be realised towards 
the attainment of SADC‟s regional integration and development goals
189
  
The ultimate objective of RISDP is to strengthen integration efforts within SADC, put 
poverty alleviation at the forefront as well as fast track the attainment of other economic, as 
well as non-economic development goals.
190
  
One of the SADC‟s greatest achievements is considered its role in fostering a sense of 
regional identity and a common political outlook on some issues. In recent years however, 
SADC has experienced trenchant divisions. These have been particularly palpable from a 
political front as has been seen in the different stances adopted towards the socio-economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe.
191
 In addition to this, there remain discrepancies between SADC‟s vision, 
and what it has in fact achieved. For example, despite the implementation of the Trade 
Protocol there remain abnormally low levels of intra SSA trade with over 80% of the SSA 
trade taking place outside the region.
192
 It should be borne in mind though that the 
organization remains relatively young and as a result, still represents a regional community, 
which is largely in its formative stages.   
From the above examination of SACU and SADC the following conclusions can be 
drawn. 
The new SACU agreement is testament to the fact that the organization has taken firm 
steps away from initially „being an arrangement of convenience‟ for the administrative 
purpose of colonial administrators, and establishing the foundation for deeper RI. The 
agreement provides for increased membership, the adoption of common positions, and 
exercises control over the trade agreements undertaken by its members. These factors have to 
be assessed in conjunction with the following considerations. Firstly, SACU has considerable 
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institutional memory, and the Common Monetary Area, which displays elements of an 
economic union, is the most integrated region within Southern Africa. The helps to yet again 
relay the extent to which the organization is deeply enmeshed in the region‟s economic 
fibre.In addition to this, the SACU has begun the process of notifying the customs union to 
the WTO. This would not only give SACU legal standing within multilateral negotiations, 
but it would furthermore help in the co-ordination efforts amongst members.
193
   
Therefore de facto this more intensive level of integration within the larger SADC 
group is an application of variable geometry. Variable geometry refers to the „sequencing [of] 
integration in geographic space, allowing subsets of countries to move faster and deeper in 
certain areas‟.
194
 Suggestions have therefore been rampant for SACU to introduce formally 
an application of variable geometry. It should be remembered that within the framework of 
SACU 2002 agreement, provision has already been made for the acceptance of new 
members.  In addition to this, SACU used as a basis for integration within the area would 
help allay the problem of overlapping memberships within the area. It is therefore clear that 
SACU used as a vehicle for deeper RI would be advantageous to Southern Africa.  
Turning to SADC, the importance that is accorded to RI is particularly palpable in 
light of the significant legal obligations that the organization has set itself. The importance 
that the organization has accorded RI is articulated not only in terms of the Trade Protocol 
but by the RISDP. The preeminence of RI in the context of SADC can therefore not be 
disputed. 
When comparing the legal obligations relating to RI that both organizations have 
undertaken, an important distinction emerges. The SADC has laid down far more 
comprehensive legal commitments explicitly addressing their RI then SACU. For example 
within the SACU 2002 Agreement there is no mention of RI. It is submitted that despite this 
though the organization is committed to integration. This is seen from the  Council of 
Ministers‟ undertaking to „define a roadmap for moving towards an Economic Community 
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  as well as the various  legal commitments that are laid down by the 
2002 Agreement which lay a foundation for the organization‟s future RI efforts.  
A criticism which can be leveled at both organizations is that they fail to sufficiently 
address Singaporean issues. The Singaporean issues refer to the new generation trade issues 
of trade and competition policy, trade and investment and transparency and government 
procurement. The name association arises because it was at the 1996 Singaporean Ministerial 
conference that a decision was taken to set up working parties in these fields.
196
 Some authors 
though include also define Singaporean issues to include trade in services, the environment 
and labour. Although Article 40 of the SACU agreement addresses competition policy, all it 
mandates is that there should be cooperation in the development of competition law and 
regulation. Alternatively, Article 25 of the SADC Protocol merely requires that members 
promote competition.  Although the Singaporean issues within the context of the EPAs [my 
emphasis] have had a negative impact on RI ,if SACU and SADC are to achieve a deeper 
level of  integration at some point in the future  these organizations will have to more 
purposefully engage in these issues.  This is because „the future trade agenda will arguably be 
defined by new generation issues‟.
197
 As it stands though it is likely that SACU and SADC do 
not have the capacity to engage in these new areas, nonetheless, they should still be looked at 
as a long term goal. What does signify a step in the right direction the SACU‟s Council of 
Ministers has recognized „the importance of developing a common strategy on new 
generation issues, such as services, investment, and intellectual property rights‟.
198
 
The above section provided a historical context for SACU, SADC and RI. In the 
following sections, the focus then turns to an examination of the other organizations pertinent 
to this dissertation, namely the ACP and the EU. In this section, a comprehensive analysis as 
the relationship of the two blocks is traced from the Lome Agreement, through to the EPAs.  
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3.2 African Caribbean Pacific group and European Union 
 The Treaty establishing the European Community, one of two Rome treaties, 
199
was signed 
in 1957 and established the European Economic Community (EEC) between the signatories; 
namely Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.  The Treaty was 
established after Europe had witnessed two world wars and the need to avoid any future 
conflicts was paramount.
200
  Consequently, the EEC endeavoured to align European countries 
together. This would take place primarily through the establishment of a common market 
aimed at developing the cohesiveness of the countries‟ economic policies.
201
  Part IV of the 
Treaty made provision for an „Association of Overseas Countries and Territories‟ (OCT). 
This provision was prompted by France, which had wanted to maintain relations with 
countries that it still identified with.
202
 The objective of the Association was to „promote the 
economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close 
economic relations between them and the Community as a whole‟. In this regard, the 
association made provision for commercial exchanges, investment opportunities and the 
abolition of customs duties.
203
 The Association agreement was both negotiated and signed 
without any input on part of the OCTs.  
From the 1950s the „winds of change‟ began to blow through Africa, as countries 
began to gain their independence.
204
 This necessitated the terms of the Treaty of Rome, 
having in many ways been imposed upon the OCTs to be redrafted.
205
 During the redrafting 
process, the countries which had formed part of the Association Agreement would continue 
in terms of the agreement on a provisional basis. However, amendments would be made to 
give cognizance to the newly independent countries. This process cumulated in the signing of 
the Yaoundé Convention in 1963 between the representatives of the EEC Member States, 17 
African countries and Madagascar. In terms of the Convention, it was furthermore agreed that 
financial support would be provided to the countries through the European Development 
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 The Southern African countries though would only gain their independence later on in the 1960s.  
205













As the original document was only valid for 5 years, it was revised in terms of the 
Yaoundé II. The emphasis of the Yaoundé Convention fell on trade. In terms of the 
Agreement, a reciprocal, preferential trading relationship was established between the ACP 
countries and the EEC.
207
  
The Yaoundé Convention did not sit well with the former English colonies. Although 
some efforts were made to address this situation, they were largely not effective.
208
This 
situation came to a head in 1973 when the United Kingdom joined the European Community.  
As a result of this, the terms of the protocols provided for the extension of the European 
development strategies to Commonwealth nations. This included the African, Carrabin and 
Pacific nations (ACP) .The formal association of these countries would be later be cemented 
by the signing of the Georgetown Agreement in 1975.
209
 After extensive negotiations, this 
developed into the Lome Agreement. This agreement was signed by 9 EEC and 46 ACP 
States.  Of particular significance in the Lome 1 Agreement was Article 7 which introduced 
the principle of non-reciprocity. It stated that  
In view of their present development needs, the ACP shall not be required, 
for the duration of this Convention, to assume, in respect of imports of 
products originating in the Community, obligations corresponding to the 
commitments entered into by the Community in respect of imports of the 
products originating in the ACP States
210
 
This agreement heralded what would be the beginning of a long relationship between 
the EU and the ACP countries. This relationship was not only sustained in terms of the Lome 
Agreement which was revisited in Lome II, Lome III and Lome IV; it was further entrenched 
in terms of the European Development Fund (EDF) initiative. This initiative saw substantial 
funds allocated to the ACP countries.
211
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For the purposes of this paper, it is not important to review the provisions of each of 
the various Lome Agreements.
212
  It is however imperative to have an understanding of key 
points. Firstly, the Lomé Conventions provided 25 years of development cooperation 
between the ACP States and the EU.
213
 The principle of non-reciprocity introduced in the 
Lome 1 Convention was carried though to Lome IV. The Lome Conventions were coupled 
with Trade Protocols on products that were deemed to be sensitive. These protocols covered 
beef, run, veal, sugar and bananas.
214
In addition to this, the Lome Conventions introduced a 
compensatory mechanism for the ACP countries which accounted for the fluctuations in the 
commodity prices in agricultural and mineral exports.
215
 The nature of the conventions 
evolved as it began to encompass more non-trade issues for example, Lome III incorporated 




At the time the Lome Convention represented the „most ambitious North-South trade 
agreement to date‟.
217
 It provided largely duty-free access to the European market, save for a 
few „sensitive agricultural products‟. The objective of the conventions had been to „integrate 
the ACP countries into the global markets and to diversify their export base‟.
218
 However, 
despite this stated aim, the countries‟ share in the EU market has fallen from 6.7 per cent in 
1976 to 3.0 percent in 2005.
219
 A particularly striking comparison is that many non -ACP 
countries, not privy to preferential access, have managed to export more goods to the 
EU.
220
This has been attributed to a number of reasons. The European Union in a 1996 Green 
Paper submission identified some of these reasons.
221
  For example the paper noted that the 
preferential access given to the ACP countries contributed towards the highly protectionist 
and uncompetitive industries, or alternatively that the ACP countries did not have an 
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environment that was conducive to the development of competitive sectors, investment 
growth or the diversification of production. 
222
 
The historical overview of the EU-ACP relationship highlights the following. Firstly, 
the two blocks have a long-standing relationship. This was founded primarily during the 
colonial periods and then later through a series of conventions. The Lome Conventions that 
sustained the trade relationship gave the ACP group preferential access to the EU market. 
This access therefore explains why it is that many countries within this group have come to 
be structurally dependent on European trade. When assessing the above factors collectively, 
Southern Africa‟s countries endemic dependence on EU trade is a product of the areas‟ 
economic history, in light of all factors a likely outcome
.
 This kind of endemic dependence 
has resulted in the ACP‟s desperately seeking ways to securing ongoing preferential market 
access to the EU market. This would even led Southern African countries to be tied to a trade 
arrangement which may have the potential to adversely impact on regional integration efforts; 
this despite the importance of RI in the region. As advanced earlier, this is not to suggest that 
the EPAs will be without benefits, but rather to indicate that RI efforts that have been poised 
to play such a central role within both organizations would lose their supremacy.  
3.3 The Economic Partnership Agreements 
3.3.1 Background and provisions of the EPAs 
The preferential access the ACP countries had with the EU, originating in the 1960s predated 
the WTO rules based dispensation. It has largely been legitimized by a series of waivers. 
These waivers however were not only becoming exceedingly vulnerable to legal scrutiny
223
; 
but furthermore, were overwhelmingly more difficult to obtain. This, together with the failure 
of the Lome Conventions to substantially impact on the development of the ACP group gave 
the EU the momentum to adopt a new approach. 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement
224
, replacing Lome IV, was concluded in 2000 
and with the exception of South Africa, all SADC countries were signatories.
225
 The Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement heralded a new era in the trade relationship of the EU and the ACP 
countries. The entire basis of the relationship metamorphosed from one based on the 
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preferential access of the ACP countries, to reciprocity.
226
 Notwithstanding this, it is 
important to remember the EPAs will both maintain, and improve upon the preferential 
market access of the ACP group. 
The Regional Economic Partnership Agreements are the trade dimension of the CPA. 
In terms of the Cotonou Agreement, the EPAs are „asymmetrical trade agreements which not 
only cover trade in goods and services, but also extend to Singaporean issues which include 
„competition, government procurement, intellectual property, and trade facilitation‟.
227
 The 
inclusion of the „Singaporean issues‟ makes the EPAs unique in that they go beyond the 
traditional trade dimensions of FTAs. In this manner, the EU proposes that the EPAs adopt a 
comprehensive approach towards the ACP countries simultaneously targeting trade, politics 
and governance as well as development. 
228
 The EU has adopted this broad based approach in 
order to circumvent the failures of previous trade arrangement. The EU believes that this 
multi-faceted approach will allow „certain policy reform measures to be „locked in‟.
229
  
The EPAs are international agreements and thus once ratified are binding on member 
countries. The objectives of the EPAs include poverty reduction; promoting regional 
integration; fostering sustainable economic and social development; ensuring compatibility 
with WTO rules, as well as the adoption of a supervisory role in the gradual transition of the 
ACP countries into the world economy.
230
  
The EPAs shall be built upon the following key principles: 
 Development  
The agreement highlights that the EPA need to be developmentally orientated. The 
central objective of the Cotonou Partnership „is the reduction and eventual eradication of 
poverty‟.
231
 It has been constantly reiterated that the EPAs „are not just common agreements 
on trade.‟
232
 This dictum forms part of the rhetoric constantly reinforced by the EU.
233
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 Reciprocity  
As stated before the reason de entrée for the EPAs has been framed around the need 
to secure WTO compatibility. The trade relationship will ultimately cumulate in the 
establishment of FTA. In terms of Article 37.7, the establishment of the FTA will involve the 
progressive abolishment of trade restrictions.
234
 Throughout the agreement reciprocity, and 
the consequent trade liberalization, is identified as unleashing a host of benefits for the ACP 
countries. These include enhancing supply and production efficiencies, attracting investment, 
improving market access as well as enhancing co-operation.
235
 This would then contribute to 
the growth and development of the countries.
236
 
The vast majority of goods from the ACP countries entering the EU already have duty 
free and quota free access. Therefore, the most substantial degree of liberalization would be 
undertaken by the ACP countries that now have to provide better market access terms to the 
EU.
237
 The requirement of reciprocity has gained much attention and its impact on the 
integration efforts of SACU and SADC will be examined in chapter 5. 
 Differentiation  
The agreement undertakes to account for the different levels of development of the 
contracting parties. This is then articulated in a number of ways. Firstly, the agreement states 
that Special and Differential treatment (SDT) allowed within the WTO will be adopted. 
Provision for SDT is built into the agreement in the form of flexibilities. These flexibilities 
will be extended in terms of transitional periods, the observance of sensitive sectors, 
asymmetry in terms of tariff liberalization, the provision of technical assistance and the 
meeting of obligations by the ACP countries.
238
 Article 41.2 underlines the importance of 
SDT to be extended to ACP suppliers in the field of trade in services.
239
  In addition to this, 
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particular attention is given to plight of LDCs as well as the overly precarious situation of 




The Partnership agreement purports to advance economic and trade co-operation 
while cognizant of the fact that „regional integration is a key instrument in the integration of 
ACP countries into the world economy‟.
241
  In addressing the RI agenda of the ACP 
countries, the following measures are therefore in place. To begin with, there is a 
commitment to provide assistance, and to develop capacities for the various objectives that 
the ACP countries have identified as being within the „context of regional and sub-regional 
co-operation and integration‟.
242
 Furthermore, the negotiations would be framed in a manner 
that accords importance to the RI processes in the ACP countries [m emphasis]. Support for 
the ACP countries‟ RI efforts however is not only captured within the agreement itself but is 
a sentiment that has been expressed through a variety of forums.
243
 
In the next section a brief detour is taken as an examination of the TDCA, South 
Africa‟s FTA with the EU, takes place. This will be done in order to shed light as to how the 
agreement came about and its relation with the rest of the BNLS states.  
3.3.2 The Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) 
The TDCA is an FTA between South Africa and the EU, primarily dealing with trade 
in goods, although some provision is made for services and investment.
244
    The primary 
reason that South Africa‟s trade relationship is not governed in terms of the Lome 
Convention is because once the country had emerged from apartheid, and negotiations thus 
began feasible, the EU felt that its economy was relatively stronger to that of the ACP 




                                                 
240
 Cotonou Partnership Agreement, Article 35.3.  
241
 Cotonou Partnership Agreement, Article 35.2.  
242
 Cotonou Partnership Agreement Article 29. 
243
 See further European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repositroy/Communication_on_Regional_Integration_COM-2008-
604_EN.pdf [accessed 22 October 2009]. 
244
 TDCA, Article 5.  
245











Negotiations for the TDCA began in 1996 and despite South Africa‟s membership to 
SACU, the EU‟s negotiating mandate explicitly excluded the possibility of incorporating the 
BNLS states into any kind of arrangement.
246
 South Africa therefore negotiated the terms of 
the agreement without consulting the BNLS states. As a result of this, not only did the BNLS 
states view the TDCA agreement with some degree of animosity, but it also created 
confusion as to what the status of the relationship between the BNLS states and the EU 
was.
247
 Attention should be drawn to the fact that as the TDCA was concluded in 1999, the 
TDCA fell under the auspices of the 1969 SACU agreement. It was therefore not bound to 
seek permission from the BNLS states prior to negotiating with a third party as is mandated 
by the 2002 Agreement
248
.  
As the BNLS states are part of SACU, they have the same economic policy as South Africa 
and have de facto incorporated many elements of the TDCA albeit, without the requisite 
consultation, compensation or consent.
249
  Therefore, the majority of the BNLS states 
imports, coming in through South Africa; enter in terms of TDCA trade liberalization 
schedule. It is only the exports from these countries that enter the EU on more favourable 
terms.
250
 The implication for the BNLS countries is substantial. The countries have been 
forced to reduce their tariffs, liberalizing their economies at an accelerated rate agreed upon 
in terms of the TDCA. This will reduce the monies generated by common external tariff 
(CET) which will, in turn have a dismal impact on the government revenues of the BNLS 
states, which substantially rely on the CET as a source of income. In addition to this because 
the TDCA was accompanied by such restrictive ROO, the BNLS states were not able to 
benefit from preferential access given to South Africa.
251
  
Although South Africa had originally only been granted observer status in 2006, it 
formally became part of an EPA.
252
This took place in order to curb the anomaly resulting 
from South Africa having its trading relationship with the EU being governed on a different 
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basis to the rest of SACU.
253
 In addition to this a working group had been established to co-
ordinate the SADC EPA negotiations and a TDCA review process.
254
 
3.3.3 The negotiation process  
In order to ensure that the negotiations did not exceed the allocated timeframe, and 
consequently disturb the continual flow of trade between the two blocks, a „two step‟ 
approach was adopted.
255
   Accordingly, the immediate focus of the negotiations was geared 
towards signing an interim EPA that would focus on trade in goods. The interim EPA is thus 
a „stop gap‟ measure to facilitate the continuation of trade.
256
   The interim EPAs would then 
be followed by a subsequent round of negotiations geared towards the signing of a full EPA, 
which would then thrash out all remaining details. 
To mitigate against skewed power relationship during the negotiation stages the EPAs 
were to be concluded by „regional blocks‟ of the ACP countries.
257
  Ideally the EPAs were to 
be negotiated through pre-existing customs unions of the ACP countries. However, given that 
within the ACP group very few regions had integrated to such a level, this was largely not 
possible.
258
Therefore, countries had to adopt a „second best‟ strategy in organizing 
negotiating groups.  
A number of considerations ultimately determined the manner through which regional 
blocks for the purpose of EPAs would emerge. Southern Africa is plagued by a „spaghetti 
bowel‟ of overlapping memberships; in addition to this, authors have asserted that national 
interests proved to be paramount over regional considerations.
259
Consequently, it was found 
to be unfeasible to negotiate within existing structures. Southern and Eastern African region 




This then lead to the creation of two new bodies whose sole purpose [my emphasis] 
was to facilitate EPA negotiations; the SADC EPA and the Eastern and Southern African 
EPA. The SADC EPA consisted of the BNLS states together with Angola, Mozambique, and 
Tanzania. Alternatively, the ESA EPA is made up of Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
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Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.261 At a later stage though Tanzania pulled out of the SADC-EPA configuration 
and began negotiations with the EU as part of EAC group. 
 




The „two step‟ approach to the EPAs allowed 35 of the 77 ACP countries to initial 
interim EPAs in time for the deadline.
263
 Consequently, in June 2009 a SADC interim EPA 
was signed by the BLS states, Mozambique and the EU.
264
 Namibia choose to initial the 
agreement, this was however done with reservations. The implication of this appears to be 
that should the impugned issues are not addressed; the country would then not sign a full 
EPA.
265
 Angola and South Africa did not sign the interim EPA; the EU had however 
indicated that it would sign an interim EPA regardless of their participation.
266
 In a joint 
declaration issued by the EC-SADC, it was however indicated that Angola might join the 
interim EPA at a later stage and participate in negotiations leading to the conclusion of a full 
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 Consequently, though it was termed an SADC interim EPA, the absence of all the 
SADC members has resulted in a „SADC minus configuration‟. 
The initialing of the interim document does not automatically give rise to legal 
obligations, but it does require that the countries do „not defeat its object and purpose prior to 
its entry into force‟.
268
 By initialing the interim EPA, the BLS states have indicated „their 
commitment to engage with the EU in negotiations on trade in services, and investment, 
government procurement and competition towards a „full‟ EPA‟ while addressing the various 
outstanding issues pertaining to trade in goods.  In order to ensure the legitimacy of the 
interim EPA, the individual national legislative processes would have to take place. On the 
European Union front, Council Regulation 1528/2007 known as the „Market access 
regulation‟ has been adopted to provide secure market access to those ACP countries that 
have initialled WTO-compatible agreements. This regulation though can be suspended on 
certain grounds.
269  
3.3.4 Contentious issues 
As was discussed in the previous section a number of countries had chosen not to sign 
the interim EPA. The following section brief outlines the reasons leading to this anomalous 
situation. 
The absence of South Africa as a signatory to the interim EPA is a flagrant omission. 
The most palpable consequence of this is that the aim of the EPAs as a proposed solution to 
harmonize trade arrangements within SACU has failed.
270
 There are a number of reasons why 
South Africa did not sign the interim EPA. Firstly, South Africa through the TDCA already 
had an FTA with the EU. Therefore, unlike the BNLS states it was not subject to the 2008 
deadline and the accompanying fear of interfere in the flow of trade. Moreover, South Africa 
has stated that it did not sign the interim EPA as it felt that the some conditions were too 
harsh and inclusive.
271
 Terms which proved to be particularly problematic was the coverage 
of services, Singaporean issues, and the inclusion of the MFN clause. These were issues that 
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South Africa had not encountered fully, given that the TDCA had largely limited to trade in 
goods. 
 South Africa has argued that the inclusion of trade in services is problematic because 
they already constitute part of ongoing negotiations at a multilateral trading level.
272
 The 
Singaporean issues are opposed on the basis that they are not required for either WTO 
compliance, and furthermore they do not form a part of the Cotonou Agreement.  
The MFN clause would require that the countries extend to the EU any trade 
concession granted to a significant trading partner.
273
 A country is regarded as a significant 
trading partner if it accounts for more than 1% of global trade. Given that, South Africa is 
pursuing an expansionist trade policy and therefore looking to trade with larger economies 
such as China, India and Mercosur, such a clause would affect it the most.
274
 
Namibia initialed the document at a later stage with reservations. The text of the interim EPA 
takes note of the fact that initialing of the document is based  
on the understanding that concerns which Namibia had identified throughout 
the negotiations of the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement would be 




While many applauded Namibia‟s decision to not initial the interim EPA the EU has 
indicated that Namibia should either initial the interim EPA, or issue a statement confirming 
that it is not a party to the agreement.
276
 Furthermore, Namibia unlike South Africa is in a 
precarious situation, it does not have a comparable trade arrangement to turn fall back on. 
This discussion continues in the following chapter.  
The BLS states and Mozambique have been criticized for signing the interim EPA in 
some sectors, as they are accused of prioritizing the trade relationship with the EU over 
regional agenda. Regardless of this, the states have forged ahead and are currently focused on 
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the negotiation of outstanding issues, as well as the implementation, notification and 
ratification of the agreement.
277
  
In the above section, an examination of the Cotonou Agreement was undertaken were 
the objectives and key principles of the EPAs were outlined. From this, it became apparent 
that in principle, RI efforts should have been greatly bolstered by the EPAs, although this 
would prove not to be the case. The subsequent section briefly looked at the negotiating 
process and the emergence of various contentious issues. This outline is important in that it 


























THE LEGAL MILIEU  
4.1 Exceptions to MFN  
The preferential access that the ACP countries enjoyed was controversial in that it 
prima facie violated the principle of non-discrimination, which is central to WTO 
jurisprudence.
278
 It violated the principle by not adhering to a core tenant of non-
discrimination being the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle. This principle is recognised 
as one of the oldest, and most important legal obligations within international economic 
law.
279
  It requires that a country„s trade relationship with all other countries [my emphasis] 
be equal to the manner that it treats its „most favoured‟ nation.
280
 Therefore, any trade 
concession that is granted towards one country must be extended to all others. The MFN 
principle is instrumental in preventing non-discrimination amongst trading partners.
281
 It is 
articulated, albeit in various forms, in three of the most important agreements covered by 
WTO; Article 1 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),  Article 2 of 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)  and Article 4 of Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
282
  
Despite the importance of this rule, it is not applied absolutely. There are certain 
circumstances in which WTO rules allow for derogations. There are two general accepted 
categories: RTAs and the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) of developing countries. 
The following section examines these accepted derogations, with a view to establishing why 
the Lome preferences could be justified under either basis. In the following section, given the 
predominance of developing and LDCs in Southern Africa, particular importance will be 
placed on the examination of SDT terms.  
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4.1.1 Regional Trade Agreements 
Article 24 of GATT, read together with the Understanding on Article XXIV attached to the 
Marrakech Agreement, provides the conditions under which RTA may be exempt from the 
application of the MFN clause in relation to trade in goods. A similar exemption regarding 
trade in services is found in Article V of GATS.
283
 The underlying rationale for this 
exemption is the belief that „under certain conditions free trade agreements benefit not only 
their members, but also the global economy as a whole through trade creation which results 
in increased overall welfare‟.
284
 Therefore, the main objective to Article XXIV had been to 
ensure that RTAs did not become obstacles to the multi-lateral trading system.  
In order to qualify for the exemption granted to RTAs, the following requirements 
should be fulfilled. The main criteria is contained in Article XXIV: 5C and Article XXIV: 8. 
Article XXIV:8 requires that a  country entering into regional trading agreements need to 
ensure that there is an „elimination of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce on 
„substantially all trade‟ between the different parties.
285
 The elimination of duties and 
restrictive regulations must furthermore in terms of Article XXIV: 5c take place within a 
‘reasonable length of time‟.
286
 Other requirements are mandated by article XXIV: 5a, which   
calls for the „neutrality of trade restrictiveness‟ requirement.
287
 This entails that any duties or 
other regulations, which are imposed on the contracting parties prior to the formation of the 
RTA, should not overall be higher. In addition to this, if in the formation of the RTA overall, 
it is found to necessary to increase tariff rates, members may have a claim for 
compensation.
288
 Lastly, contracting parties are required to notify WTO members‟ who can 
then examine the RTAs for compliance with stipulated rules.
289
  
The EU-ACP relationship failed to qualify under Article XXIV as a FTA primarily 
because the relationship was premised on a non-reciprocal basis. It is not possible to extend 
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non-reciprocal preferences when there is a requirement laid down to liberalize substantially 
all trade.  
For developing countries, the most controversy exists behind the interpretation of  the 
phrases „substantially all trade‟ as well as „within a reasonable period of time‟ In a number of 
FTAs, the phrase „substantially all trade‟ has been interpreted to mean the elimination of 86-
90% of duties. Alternatively, „reasonable length of time‟ in terms of the Understanding on 
Article XXIV is regarded as a period of 10 years.
290
 Where a reasonable period exceeds 10 
years will only be allowed in exceptional cases, in reality though many FTAs often exceed 
the 10-year limit.
291
 It is partly because of the varying interpretations that have been given to 
Article XXIV that no FTA has ever been challenged for WTO compliance. The interpretation 
given to the various criteria has been the subject of much controversy.  
4.1.2 Special and Differential treatment of developing countries  
The second generally accepted departure from the principle of non-discrimination is the 
special status that is accorded to developing countries. This group of countries now 
constitutes up to two thirds of the WTO. When the GATT had originally been negotiated 11 
of the 23 contracting parties would have been classified as developing countries, this however 
proved to be immaterial.
292
 Developing countries are playing an increasingly important role 
within the global economy, and many of them have begun to seek trade as a developmental 
tool. In light of this, the WTO has made a host of concessions so as to take into account their 
particular needs and circumstances.  
One of the central ways through which this special status is articulated is by affording 
developing countries Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). The fundamental 
justification for extending SDT is that „equal treatment could secure equality only among 
identical parties‟.
293
 Developing countries are „intrinsically disadvantaged in their 
participation in international trade and therefore any multilateral agreement involving them 
and developed countries must take into account [this] weaknesses‟.
294
 
                                                 
290
 Understanding on Article XXIV: 5 (3). 
291




 Ochieng (note 2) at 3. 
294
 Constantine Michalopoulos „Trade and Development in GATT and WTO: The role of Special and 











There are 145 SDT clauses spread across the various WTO texts.
295
In general, there 
are two different categories of SDT provisions given to developing countries. In the first 
category fall all the positive actions that developed countries have the freedom to extend to 
developing countries.
296
 These include preferential access to markets, the provision of 
technical as well as other forms of assistance that enable developing countries to undertake 
their WTO obligations. Developed countries are also called to implement obligations in such 
a manner as to not damage the interests of developing countries 
The second category of SDT includes exceptions to rules that can be claimed by 
developing countries.
297
 Therefore encompasses the differential commitments that developing 
countries are given. They include exceptions from certain disciplines and time extensions. In 
addition, they extend to the adoption of certain measures to protect domestic industries, such 
as the application of quantitative restrictions. 
4.1.3 The History of Special and Differential treatment 
Part IV of the GATT initially introduced the SDT terms in 1964. Of particular significance 
are its principles and objectives, as well as Article 8, which states that „developed contracting 
parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to 
reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to trade of less-developed countries‟.
298
  
Despite the introduction of Part IV, many developed countries still appeared to be 
uncertain as to whether it provided a legal basis to accord non-reciprocal treatment to 
developing countries. They were therefore hesitant to accord preferential treatment, lest this 
would represent an unlawful departure from the MFN principle. This problem was in part 
addressed in 1968 with the assistance of United Nations Committee on Trade and 
Development developing countries were able to establish a General System of Preferences 
(GSP).
299
 Although they were not legally binding, the GSP allowed developing  countries the 
option of granting more favourable trade terms to developing countries To further dispel any 
lingering questions of the legality of the GSP in light of MFN obligations, the Council of 
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Ministers, issued a waiver in 1971 which would extend over a period of ten years.300 The GSP 
then became a permanent derogation from the MFN principle with the Council of Ministers 
1979 Differential and More Favourable Treatment and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries decision („the Enabling Clause‟).
301
  
The Enabling Clause represented a summation of all the efforts that had been made to 
account for developing countries‟ concerns.
302
 As it is not obligatory, it has been described as 
a „negative right for preference giving developed countries‟.
303
 It did not extend any 
additional rights, but explicitly clarified what was permissible. It spelt out the following 
categories of exceptions. It firstly, allowed for greater market access for developing 
countries, which would be granted on a non-reciprocal basis; therefore explicitly legitimizing 
the GSP.
304
 Secondly, the Enabling clause made provision for more favourable treatment for 
developing countries in terms of the rules relating to Non Trade Barriers.
305
  Preferential 
RTAs between developing countries, or so-called „South-South‟ agreements were 
permissible.
306




From the above section, it can be seen that SDT treatment of developing countries has 
developed into an important WTO principle. In particular, GSP has provided developed 
countries with a permanent derogation from the application of the MFN principle. The 
following section outlines the EU‟s GSP system.  
4.1.4 The EU’s preference regime  
The EU has a three-tired GSP program. At the bottom of the preference, hierarchy is 
the standard GSP program. This provides preferential access in the form of reduced tariffs for 
goods to 176 developing countries. It is implemented in terms of a European Union Council 
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regulation for three-year blocks.
308
 The latest standard GSP regulation has been issued from 
the 1 January 2009- 31 December 2011.  
The second tier of the EU‟s GSP program is the GSP plus initiative. This is a „special 
incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance‟,
309
 which is 
available to all developing countries as long as fulfil certain criteria.
310
 From the outset, 
prospective beneficiaries must be classified as vulnerable. Vulnerability is determined by 
assessing the degree of diversification and integration within the multi-lateral trading system. 
In addition to this, the aspirant state would need to display a commitment to human rights, 
labour rights, the environment and good governance.
311
 The commitment to these various 
fields would then be substantiated by the signing, ratification, and implementation of 16 
conventions on core human and labour rights, and at least seven of the conventions related to 
the environment and governance principles.
312
  
 The third tier of the EU‟s system of preferences is the „Everything But Arms‟ 
initiative (EBA). It provides duty free access to all LDCs imports apart from arms and 
ammunitions.
313
 The EBA is an improvement from the standard GSP arrangement, and has 
accordingly been far more influential.
314
 Unlike the other forms of the GSP program, EBA is 
not linked to a time line and preferences afforded to LDCS are „maintained indefinitely‟.
315
 
Although the EBA is discriminatory, by distinguishing between developing countries and 
LDCs, this is permitted because it grants „special preferences to a permissible grouping of 
countries, the LDCs.‟
316
 In terms of the EBA, LDCs in Southern Africa already have secured 
duty free and quota free access to the EU market.  
4.1.5 Critique of the EU’s system of preferences  
The following criticisms can be issued in relation to the EU‟s GSP program. Firstly, the GSP 
system has „particularly restrictive rules of origin.
317
 This explains why it is that some LDCs 
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choose to export under Lome preferences as opposed to the more beneficial EBA.
318
 
Secondly, as is the hallmark with many of SDT terms within the WTO the preferences are not 
contractual, and are therefore tantamount to a „non-binding best endeavour clause‟.
319
 
While the GSP plus program represents significant improvements, it is problematic in 
a number of respects. Firstly, many countries find the rigorous application process onerous to 
comply with. It should be remembered that countries are constantly monitored for 
compliance with the various requirements; therefore there is always the possibility of 
preferences being withdrawn. For example, in 1992 the United States terminated India‟s GSP 
privileges pertaining to $60 million worth of exports on pharmaceutical products. This 
termination allegedly arose as result of India not according sufficient intellectual property 
protection.
320
 If countries within Southern Africa applied for the program they would need to 
do so mindful of these pitfalls. 
321
 
 In relation to the standard GSP and the EBA the following can be said. Firstly the 
product eligibility requirements have greatly limited the scope of the program.  In support of 
this, research has furthermore shown that many areas were developing countries display a 
comparative advantage in production of a good; it is classified as a competitive product, the 
GSP system does not apply. This explains why it was that for a significant period of time the 
EU‟s GSP had excluded agriculture, a sector where many African countries are efficient 
producers.
322
Another contributing factor lessening the ambit  of the programs is the system of 
„graduations‟. Once a country graduates from the United Nations list of LDC, it is then 
ineligible for the GSP program.
323
 
The following comments are made based on an examination of SDT provisions, and 
the EU‟s GSP system. In terms of the WTO, permitted preferences are those which are 
granted on a generalised [my emphasis] basis, and do not discriminate among developing 
countries.
324
 This is the central reason why the Lome preferences could not be justified in 
terms of the EU‟s GSP. The preferential access that the ACP countries enjoyed placed them 
at the apex of the preferences given by the EU. Not only did this discriminate against other 
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developing countries, but in some instances against LDCs. This form of arbitrary 
discriminatory was therefore very problematic.  
The legal vulnerability of the preferences was aptly displayed by the successive legal 
challenges to the EU banana regime. The basis of the dispute arose from the Protocol 5 
contained in Lome IV. Article 1 of this Protocol states that  
In respect of its banana exports to the Community markets, no 
ACP State shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional 
markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less favourable 
situation than in the past or at present325  
The ACP countries were consequently given duty free access. However, non-ACP 
countries faced either quantitative restrictions or licensing agreements. This led to a group of 
Latin American countries challenging the legality of the regime, as a member of the WTO,  
the EU would ordinarily be obligated to apply the MFN  principle.
326
 The dispute 
surrounding the EU banana regime is long and convoluted, having resulted in cases at GATT, 
WTO and the European Court of Justice. However, the result was that the Banana producers 




The banana dispute demonstrated that the Lome regime was incongruent with the 
multilateral trading rules. This legal precedent meant that many other aspects of the Lome 
Conventions, and the accompanying trade conventions were potentially subject to legal 
review. This, coupled with the establishment of the WTO system, an empowered dispute 
resolution mechanism, increased the imperative to comply with WTO rules. In order to avoid 
any future legal entanglements, the EU undertook to secure a WTO waiver. This was secured 
in 2001 with the express instruction that a new WTO compliant trading arrangement should 
be negotiated.
328
 The impetus for renegotiating the EPAs had already been created. 
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4.2 Investigating legal alternatives and safeguards 
It needs to be emphasised that in terms of the Cotonou agreement, there is no legal obligation 
to conclude an EPA. In support of this Article 37(6) of Cotonou Agreement states that the EU 
„should examine all alternatives possible in order to provide ACP countries with a new 
framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation and in conformity with 
WTO rules‟.
329
 Article 37(6) had envisaged that this review would take place in 2004, this 
deadline was since been extended. On the basis of this provision, there has been much 
criticism for the EU who have purportedly not exhausted alternative strategies
330
  
Recently the EU has however indicated that Article 37.6 was only to be instituted in 
„exceptional circumstances‟ at the instance of a non LDC ACP country. Peter Madelson, the 
former EU Commissioner has furthermore continuously emphasized that taking such a route 
would be settling for a „second best‟ solution. He has further indicated that to date, no ACP 
country has requested the EU to examine alterative scenarios.
331
   
It however remains important to investigate the legal avenues, which ACP countries 
would have to navigate, either in the absence of the EPAs, or alternatively to negate certain 
effects. Mindful of this, the following section briefly investigates four alternative legal 
regimes that could potentially avail themselves. These alternatives have not been tersely 
selected. They represent the options that are most frequently discussed by scholars and 
authors, as well of being flagged by civil society groups as solutions. The objective of this 
section is twofold. It aims to clarify the legal veracity of some of the alternatives offered. As 
well as assessing what broader ramifications these alternatives would have. 
4.2.1 Extension of a waiver  
This is a measure that has already been pursued by the EU in order to legitimize the 
Lome preferences. In addition to this, it has also allowed countries such as the United States 
to continue a number of its preferential trading regimes.
332
 The possibility of extending a 
waiver raises a number of problematic issues. Firstly, under GATT, waivers had previously 
been granted under Article XXIV. However, upon the establishment of WTO, waivers now 
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fall under the auspices of the Understanding in respect of Waiver as well as Article IX of the 
WTO agreement.
333
  The new waiver mechanism is far more rigid. One of the implications of 
this is that waivers are no longer granted for infinite periods. They are instead subject to 
annual reviews. Furthermore, they are only granted in exceptional circumstances with the 
support of three quarters of the WTO members.
334
 
In light of this, if the EU was to seek a waiver to continue with the Lome preferences 
conditions such as annual reviews would create instability. The annual review „acts as a built-
in disincentive‟.
335
 It has consequently been argued that the new mechanism „reduces the 
commercial value of a waiver‟.
336
 As many potential investors would be intimidated by a 
regime which is subject to such a degree of volatility. 
Secondly, the EU had encountered great difficulty in securing the 2001 waiver, which 
had only been granted after protracted negotiations and certain concessions had been 
offered.337 It is highly doubtful that the EU possesses the political will needed to successful 
push through a waiver application. In addition to this, the precedent that has been set by 
recent waiver applications is not promising. Although the United States had requested a 
waiver for its African Growth and Opportunity Act in 2005, this still has not been addressed. 
338
  
Assessing the above factors together, it is thus clear that obtaining a waiver is not a 
satisfactory long-term solution. It is thus an alternative that would most likely encounter 
opposition from both the EU and the ACP countries.  
4.2.2 GSP system  
The GSP system presents the simplest alternative to the EPAs. Part of this is 
attributed to the fact that most of the ACP countries in the absence of an EPA, or any another 
trade regime, have their market access provisions automatically reverted to standard GSP 
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provisions. This would take place without any negotiation required.
339
 However, as outlined 
above there are a number of challenges relating to the system. It is non-contractual, this 
coupled with product exclusions and graduation systems render the system erratic. 
Additionally the requirements of the GSP plus would be too onerous for many countries 
Therefore, although it may be fallback position, the GSP system is not an ideal option.  
4.2.3 Amendment of the Enabling clause  
Both the procedural and substantive requirements of the Enabling clause are significantly less 
onerous then Article XXIV.
340
 However, the Enabling clause as earlier discussed only 
extends to South-South RTAs. The issue then becomes whether the Enabling clause could be 
extended to make provision for North-South RTAs. 
Onguglo has pointed out that a serious problem with extending the scope of the 
Enabling clause is that its coverage of South-South agreement is increasingly being subject to 
legal challenge.
341
 Furthermore, given that the section has no formal linkages to Article 
XXIV, it therefore could be perceived as providing a mechanism for bypassing the 
requirement for waivers, and inconspicuously reintroducing non-reciprocal preferences.  
In addition to this, if the Enabling clause was extended to include RTA s between 
developed and developing countries with provision made for preferential treatment, this 
would constitute a gross assault on MFN principle by allowing for „discretionary 
discrimination‟.
342
 In light of the above, the Enabling clause is not a viable option. 
4.2.4 Amending Article XXIV and the incorporation of SDT 
The ambiguity relating to Article XXIV and the corresponding Understanding on Article 
XXVI has been the subject of much debate. What has drawn particular attention has been the 
definition of „substantially all trade‟ and „within a reasonable period of time‟. It is clear that 
„substantially all trade‟ amounts to more than merely some trade.
343
 However, the section 
provides no clarity as to how this should be measured. Would it require that both parties 
liberalize the same volume or percentage of trade? Alternatively, could this be calculated 
differently, excluding certain tariff lines? 
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In terms of the requirement that trade liberalization takes place within a reasonable 
period of time. The Understanding issued in relation to Article XXIV indicates a 10-year 
period. However in even in the absence of exceptional circumstances needed to go beyond a 
10 year period many RTAs have exceeded these time frames. There are many examples of 
countries which have taken more than a 10 year transitional period.  This includes the TDCA, 
which has provided for a 12-year transition period. Although this may have become a 
practice, it has not created a legal guarantee.
344
  
The EU has traditionally understood the „substantially all trade‟ requirement as 
directing 90% of trade to be liberalized. Their interpretation provides for some asymmetry to 
be adopted as 90% is only required to be an average. For example within the SADC interim 
EPA the EU has agreed to 100% liberalization, while the BLS and Mozambique have agreed 
to 80% liberalization.
345
 The ACP countries are seeking for more asymmetry then this would 
provide.  
Academics argue that the different interpretive devices that are utilized by the two 
blocks are reflective of the different sets of interests being advanced. The EU is perceived as 
pushing for a more literal interpretation of Article XXIV which would allow it greater access 
to the ACP markets.
346
 While the ACP countries, fearful of the effect of reciprocity, are 
advocating for a more liberal interpretation to be adopted. 
Another matter that has caused controversy is the absence of any SDT terms in Article 
XXIV. SDT is an integral part of the trading system. The ACP countries represent some of 
the world‟s poorest nations. Thus if provisions favouring developing countries are not taken 
into account within the context of the EPAs, these provisions run the risk being rendered 
obsolete. It has therefore been argued that its absence „constitutes a prima facie case for 
reforming and injecting SDT provisions into the WTO‟.
347
 This anomaly becomes 
particularly obvious if compared to Article V of GATS, were distinction is drawn between 
North-South RTA and South-South RTAs. The resulting imbalance that is created as a result 
of the degree of flexibilities that are available under Article V as opposed to Article XXIV 
constitutes „a legal inconsistency in the architecture of WTO rules in goods and services.
348
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The legality of Article XXIV and the absence of SDT terms were further questioned 
by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa which found that „in its un-amended 
form Article XXIV should not provide the rules with which EPAs should be compatible‟.
349
 
It has further been said that Article XXIV was designed with developed nations in mind and 
that it therefore lacks context at a time when developing countries constitute the majority 
member of the WTO.
350
 To a degree, this is substantiated by the fact that Article XXIV 
predates the introduction of SDT in the WTO by three decades.
351
 However, what is 
problematic about this contention is that at the Uruguay Round of negotiations, where SDT 
terms were integrated into the WTO, Article XXIV was never amended. 
It has been proposed that Article XXIV embraces sufficient flexibilities to incorporate 
a trading relationship of this nature.
352
 This argument is however flawed. The existing 
flexibility in Article XXIV is created largely by the ambiguity in the language and the 
resulting conflicting interpretations.
353
 This de facto flexibility in the face of a rules-based 
dispensation, such as the WTO, with an accompanying enforceable dispute resolution 
mechanism is „inadequate in providing sound a legal basis and security for the flexibilities 
that would be deemed necessary for ACP states under EPAs‟.
354
 Additionally legal 
uncertainty has begun to arise as a result of excessive reliance on the tolerance by WTO 
members under the cover of existing flexibilities in Article XXIV.
355
 
In April 2004, the ACP countries had submitted a document to the WTO, which 
proposed the introduction of SDT into Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause.
356
 One of the 
core submissions of the ACP countries calls for the incorporation of SDT in to the 
substantially all trade requirement, and the in relation to transition periods.  The EU has also 
acknowledged the need for SDT.
357
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From the above, it is clear that a bevy of challenges would arise if either a waiver or 
the GSP system was adopted, or alternatively the Enabling clause was amended. The 
amendment of Article XXIV therefore appears to be this less problematic manner to approach 
this problem.
358
 A possible amendment to Article XXIV in a strict sense is not an alternative, 
but it would cushion the blow to the ACP countries. This would merely be an application of 
Article XXIV, in a less onerous manner. An examination of Article XXIV forms part of the 
Doha Development round of negotiations; the potential of these negotiations is briefly 
discussed in the next section.  
4.2.5 The Doha Development round of negotiations  
An examination of Article XXIV, as well as SDT is part of the stalled Doha Development 
round. It forms part of one of the unresolved issues which have been taken to accommodate 
developing countries. This round of negotiations has committed itself to clarifying the 
interpretation of the impugned article as well as what role SDT of developing countries are 
accorded within RTA.
359
 In this regard the ACP Council of Ministers has called on the EU to 
support the modification of RTA rules as well as  
stressing the need for WTO rules to be modified to incorporate legal binding 
operational S&D provisions in order to create flexibilities for developing countries 
engaged in Regional Trade Arrangements with developed countries.
360
   
The importance of SDT was recently reaffirmed by the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
which stated that „provisions for special and differential treatment are an integral part of the 
WTO agreements‟. It called for a review of WTO SDT provisions with the objective of 
„strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational‟.
361
  
There is no doubt that the outcome of the round of negotiations will have a significant 
impact on the EPAs. Currently the WTO negotiations are suspended and even when they take 
place, they are admittedly stagnant. The outcome of the negotiations could take years. In the 
meantime, the EU/ACP trade relationship requires restructuring, and must therefore comply 
with the WTO rules as they stand [my emphasis]. From this, it is clear that although the Doha 
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Development Round is imbued with potential to alter the interpretation of Article XXIV, it is 
insufficient to peg efforts on the conclusion of negotiations.  
In concluding this section, the following remarks can be made. Strictly speaking [my 
emphasis] there is truth to the arguments that there are a number of legal alternatives to the 
EPAs. However, these arguments fail to give sufficient regard to the number of problems 
associated with these alternatives. A possible extension of the waiver would expose both the 
EU and the ACP countries to a host of problems. Not only is it probable that the EU lacks the 
political will to secure another extension, but furthermore both trading blocks would be faced 
with stringent waiver provisions and annual reviews. Alternatively, the GSP system, in all its 
various guises, would subject the ACP countries to a system plagued by uncertainty. On the 
other hand attempting to amend the Enabling clause would be extremely unlikely, 
particularly considering that it is the subject of legal scrutiny.  
Of all the alternatives discussed, an amendment of Article XXVI stands out as the 
most viable alternative. From the above discussion, it can clearly be seen that the 
interpretation pertaining to Article XXIV is extremely problematic and may be addressed 























THE IMPACT ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION  
In light of the preceding chapters, the impact that the EPAs will have on RI efforts 
within SACU and SADC can be assessed under the following headings. 
5.1 THE SPLINTERING OF SACU and SADC 
The SACU has broken into two sects. The BLS states on one hand, and South Africa 
and Namibia on the other. There are many implications arising from this. Firstly, the BLS 
states have been segregated from South Africa, the regional hegemony that contributes over 
95% of the SACU‟s GDP. 
362
 An EPA that excludes the most important economy in the 
regional is not an ideal situation and may complicate future regional relations 
Secondly, the attempt to harmonize the trade relationship between the BNLS states, 
the EU, and South Africa has failed. The harmonization of the relationship had been initiated 
when South Africa had formally joined the SADC EPA. If successful, the harmonization was 
poised to be one of the greatest benefits of the EPAs within Southern Africa. South Africa 
has failed to sign the SADC EPA. The BNLS states and South Africa therefore continue to 
have their relationship with the EU regulated in terms of two different trade arrangements; 
this is an untenable position.  The confusion relating to the status between the BNLS states 
and the EU thus continues. 
It has been proposed that the two different trade relationships will necessitate the need 
for more stringent application of border control and rules of origin.
363
 This results because of 
the need to apply the different trade terms of the TDCA, as opposed to the SADC EPA. This 
is an affront to the objectives of RI. An interesting question in this regard is whether the 
TDCA relationship constitutes a violation of Article 31 of the SACU agreement. An analysis 
of the first paragraph of section 31 is to no avail. It states that „member states may maintain 
preferential trade and other related arrangements existing at the time of entry into force of 
this Agreement‟.
364
 The difficulty with this section is that it gives the members of the customs 
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union an unqualified right [my emphasis] to maintain existing preferential arrangements. By 
not limiting the type of membership that the SACU states may undertake, there is therefore 
no requirement to ensure compatibility, or cohesiveness of different arrangements such as the 
TDCA. There is therefore a possibility of member states being party to conflicting 
arrangements.  
Another problem that arises is not so much that a country, which is a member of a 
customs union, is individually a member of an FTA. Rather, it is that where there are multiple 
memberships to different organizations there is an inevitable [my emphasis] impact on the 
CET as the different rules of origin render the original customs union unrecognizable. The 
definitive question is whether SACU would be able to survive the fragmentation between 
South Africa, Namibia and the BLS. Will the organization still comply with the legal 
definition of a customs union –as described in chapter 2; which if recapped, requires a CET 
in relation to third party states, and that no tariffs are adopted between member countries.
365
 
As was also earlier outlined in chapter 2, Article 31 of the SACU agreement requires 
that members secure permission prior to undertaking agreements with third parties. In a worst 
case scenario what would happen if South Africa refused to give the BLS states permission to 
negotiate towards a full EPA. Although highly unlikely, this would lead to the disintegration 
of the organization. This disintegration would additionally shut the door on SACU being used 
as a vehicle for deeper regional integration efforts within the SADC in terms of the 
application of variable geometry. Not only is this a viable option, but takes advantage of 
SACU‟s potential, and furthermore help address the problem of overlapping memberships.  
The disintegration of SACU would be an immensurable loss, robbing the region of the 
oldest and most effective RI arrangement that represents one of only two monetary 
integration schemes in Africa.
366
  
The SADC group now has established four separate negotiating configurations in 
relation to the EU. The SADC EPA, the TDCA, the EBA and EAC EPA, Each of these 
configurations have their own different tariff schedules. The SADC-EPA, instead of 
encompassing all members of the organization, excludes four of its original founders, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Malawi and Zambia.  
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 This will impact on SADC‟s plan for the formation of customs union. Ideally, all 
members of the union have the same trade commitments. This allows for easier 
administration and evades the possibility of different configurations creating conflicting trade 
commitments. Consequently, countries, which are planning to establish a customs union, 
should be party to the same EPA. This would require that members of the countries who are 
intent on being part of the SADC CU to have negotiated an EPA within the SADC 
framework. In terms of the SADC Trade Protocol, the SADC CU will be formed in 2012. 
However, this is not the case. The membership of SADC is currently split between the SADC 
EPA and the ESA EPA. SADC countries who have been included in the ESA EPA are 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Seychelles, Mauritius and the DRC. Furthermore, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Mauritius were part of the eleven countries who have recently established the 
SADC FTA.   It can therefore be seen that although the SADC EPA and the ESA EPA have 
in subsumed members of existing integration arrangements, this arrangement though „hardly 
[accounts for] countries‟ economic and strategic interests and the consequences for deeper 
regional integration‟.
367
 In light of the above, it is worth asking whether in determining these 
negotiating blocks SADC members had any regard of Part 8 of the Trade protocol, which 
requires member countries in negotiating with third parties to consider its objectives. 
The EPAs have further contributed to the splintering of SACU and SADC in the 
following ways.  
5.1.1 Negotiations taking place outside of existing regional structures  
The EPAs have contributed another layer of complexities to the „spaghetti bowel‟ 
arrangement of regional organizations on the continent. Regional groupings through which 
the EPAs are being discussed do not embrace existing organizations. It would appear that 
many African countries opted to favour national interest as opposed to advancing the regional 
agenda when choosing negotiating partners. 
368
 This has already fallen foul of the pillars of 
the EPAs, which is discussed in chapter 3 were said to account for existing regional 
integration agendas.  
In addition to this, another arising problem is that within the text of the interim EPA the BLS 
and Mozambique have been defined as the „SADC EPA‟. This reference though is made to an 
organization that does not actually exist, and therefore has no legal status. How the 
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obligations that are placed on the SADC EPA relate to SACU and SACU is not clear. This 
adds another element of uncertainty to the EPAs. 
5.1.2 Divide between LDCs and non LDCs  
The different classification of countries as non-LDC and LDC could further exacerbate the 
splintering of SACU and SADC. It has been have noted that „least developed countries 
currently have little incentive to participate in an EPA purely from a trading perspective, as 
they would hardly gain any additional market access in the EU in return for opening up their 
market‟.
369
 As noted earlier, unlike other GSP systems, the EBA initiative is purported to be 
maintained for an unlimited period. In addition to this, previous stringent rules of origin have 
been liberalized making the initiative even more appealing.
370
  
Despite this, the BLS states have however chosen to enter into an EPA, negating the 
incentives that they have under the EBA program.  There are possible explanations for this. 
Perhaps the BLS states found that the stability of the EPAs to be appealing. However it is 
more likely that although development finance has not been made conditional on the 
conclusion of an EPA, LDCs may fear that there would be repercussions of some sort for not 
participating in what the EU has admitted to be its preferred arrangement.  
That being said though, Lesotho and Swaziland would still have recourse to the EBA 
program lest they pull out of the EPA. This would throw SACU into complete disarray as it 
would be scattered into three different groups, Namibia and South Africa; Botswana, and 
then the two LDCs, Lesotho and Swaziland.  
It remains to be seen what measures Namibia will adopt. Namibia is not regarded as a 
LDC, although this classification has been controversial, what it does mean is that the country 
does not have recourse to the EBA, and would be relegated to the terms of the less favourable 
standard GSP.
371
 As Namibia has initialled the interim EPA with reservations, the arising 
legal ambiguity perpetuates the uncertainty surrounding this trade regime.  One wonders 
whether the country will finally relent and sign the full EPA. 
5.1.3 The Singaporean issues 
The Singaporean issues also known as „WTO –plus‟ or „new generation issues‟ as they go 
beyond the realm of what is required by the WTO. In addition to this, they do not form part 
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of the Cotonou Agreement. They have however been incorporated into the EPAs as part of 
the EU‟s holistic strategy for the ACP countries.  
The brief history of the Singaporean issues within trade negotiations is controversial. 
The EU has been a most ardent supporter. It has thus been campaigning for their inclusion in 
multilateral negotiations. At this level however many countries, particularly developing 
countries, have been vehemently opposed to them. Developing countries opposition was 
based on the argument that they felt that the scope of the issues „was unclear and that they 
lacked the technical capacity to implement them‟.
372
 The Ministerial Conference in Cancun 
had in part collapsed because of the EU‟s insistence that Singaporean issues form part of 
negotiations.
373
  The rejection of Singaporean issues is a sentiment that has been levelled 
equally by both the ACP group and the AU.
374
 In spite of this, the Singaporean issues are 
being discussed through the artificial bodies of the ESA EPA and the SADC EPA.  
Assessed in relation to RI efforts, Singaporean issues are problematic in a number of 
respects. Firstly, as discussed in chapter 3 in order for both SACU and SADC to attain 
significant levels of integration these areas will have to be engaged in a significant manner. 
However, this has not yet taken place [my emphasis]. Negotiating with a third party prior to 
securing regional cohesion will constrain the negotiation process in these areas. As 
Mozambique and the BLS states will already have pre-existing obligations, the policy space 
for negotiations within these areas is limited. Divisions may arise between SACU members 
who are willing to acquiesce to a pre-negotiated set of rules and regulations, and those who 
are not. For example, within the field of competition law and policy, developing countries 
have been cautioned against the temptation to „copy and paste‟ competition models from 
developed countries.
375
 The set of policies and law needs to be framed against the specific 
needs of the particular area. To have pr-existing commitments in such a field could prove to 
be extremely debilitating  
The Singaporean issues have already been identified as one of the „contentious issues‟ 
which have prevented South Africa and Namibia from initialing the interim EPA. In addition 
to this, it is doubtful whether the BLS and Mozambique have the necessary funding, or 
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capacity to institute the institutional and legal amendments that will be required to implement 




From this, it can be seen overarching criticism that can be levelled against the 
inclusion of the Singaporean issues into the EPAs is that it is incongruent to the pace of RI. It 
would appear that although the Singaporean issues have all but been scrapped from 
multilateral negotiating table, they have re-emerged „through the backdoor door of regional 
agreements‟
377
 where developing countries seem to not have the collective bargaining power 
to oppose them. 
In the above discussion it was highlighted how by splintering regional organizations 
the EPAs have adversely affected both existing, and future RI efforts in a number of ways. 
They have prevented the harmonization of trade relationships between the BNLS, EU and 
South Africa; possibly rendered SACU unrecognizable in terms of the legal definition of a 
customs union; and furthermore stifled the negotiation space that SACU and SADC would 
have regarding Singaporean issues. Over and above this the EPAs have undermined the legal 
obligations and goals that both SACU and SADC have set out as assessed in chapter 3. 
Although this signing of a treaty or a protocol does not of itself give rise to integration, the 
dignity and sacredness of both legal texts has been compromised.  
5.2 Reciprocity  
The emphasis on reciprocity has by far been the most controversial consequence of the EPAs.  
It has elicited concern from countless civil society groups who question the impact that 
reciprocity will have on the developmental aspirations of the ACP countries. The 
developmental impact of the EPAs, within the context of this paper, is important because as 
was demonstrated in chapter 2 one of the central objectives of RI, particularly within an 
African context, has been the need to facilitate the development of the region. The imperative 
for RI efforts to adopt a developmental focus has been emphasized emphatically within 
SACU, SADC, and the EPAs as outlined in chapter 2 and 3.This yet again, bears testament to 
the intrinsic relationship that RI and development have come to share. Therefore it is 
important to understand the impact that the EPAs may have on the developmental efforts of 
the ACP countries. 
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 When discussing reciprocity it is important to frame this discussion within the 
appropriate context. It is essential to bear in mind that there has been a litany of theories, 
debates and discussions which have questioned the efficacy of employing liberalization 
strategies as components of economic policies. These debates have raged since the 1990s 




In this regard the following should be noted. Firstly, „whilst no country has developed 
by turning its back on international trade, none has developed by simply liberalizing trade 
either‟ [my emphasis].
379
 It is therefore overly simplistic to believe that reciprocal trade 
liberalization would naturally lead to greater trade and economic growth, a criticism that has 
been leveled at the EU.
380
 
Secondly, the negative impact that reciprocity may have on Southern Africa should 
not be understated. The negative impact can be grouped into the direct and the indirect 
effects. Directly, reciprocity will expose the local economies to more competitive European 
producers; as well as adversely affecting government revenue, particularly in countries such 
as Lesotho and Swaziland. The indirect impact of reciprocity would potentially compromise 
efforts geared towards stimulating growth, employment as well as poverty reduction.
381
  
Reciprocity has therefore received untoward criticism. From the onset the ACP 
countries were concerned about the implications of such a requirement on the development 
front, stating that „given the possible adverse effect of reciprocity on domestic production and 
fiscal stability in ACP states, the latter cannot a priori accept to provide reciprocity in EPAs 
with the EU.‟
382
 Furthermore, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has 
observed in regards to the EPAs that „for the Southern Africa region, the benefits that SADC 
region expects are not guaranteed to be substantial enough to outweigh the potential costs.‟
383
 
It has further been argued that reciprocity should not be arbitrarily linked to time 
frames, figures or the interpretation of provisions of the WTO.
384
 Rather, it should be 
determined by taking into account „levels of trade, development and financial need‟,
385
 as is 
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mandated in terms of the principle of differentiation encompassed in the Cotonou Agreement. 
This is furthermore in line with the Nairobi Declaration which expressed the hope that „the 
African regions should be allowed to pursue their regional integration processes at a pace that 
is commensurate with their political, economic and social capacities‟.
386
Critics have 
accordingly called for reciprocity to be cautiously approached, and all measures taken to 
avoid prioritizing a relationship with the EU over the regional agenda. Only once RI has 
progressed substantially should integration within the world economy become a goal.
387
  
There is merit to the above criticisms. Notwithstanding this, there remains an 
understated dimension to this quandary. There is the need for developing countries to be wary 
of only looking towards non-reciprocal trade obligations and begin to adopt asymmetries, 
flexibilities or something „less then full reciprocity‟ as opposed to non-reciprocity. Although 
asymmetric trade obligations are still preferential, they require a measure of quid pro quo.  
The need to move away from completely non-reciprocal obligations is created by the 
following considerations. As members of the WTO, both the SACU and the SADC members 
have committed themselves to the multi-lateral trading system. One of the reason de entrée 
underpinning the system is the imperative to promote openness and trade liberalization.
388
 
The SDT treatment of developing countries is an established doctrine within WTO 
jurisprudence and the need to clarify SDT rules has been highlighted. However, non-
reciprocal obligations as a component of SDT needs to be juxtaposed against the 
consideration of how long developing countries will be given leeway to evade such an 
instrumental element of the WTO.  
It seems to be taken for granted that the EU is not under a legal obligation to seek 
ways to legitimise preferential access for the ACP countries. Although, perhaps partly 
motivated by the dire socio-economic circumstance of some of the ACP countries, trade with 
the block cannot be simply understood as a philanthropic exercise.  In terms of its WTO rules 
the EU obligations are clear; the pinnacle obligation is to apply the MFN principle towards 
trading partners. In relation to developing countries in terms of Part IV of GATT, and the 
Enabling clause , the EU is called to accord favourable treatment, this is however not an 
obligation [my emphasis] 
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Some scholars have suggested that one of the underlying rationales underpinning the 
Lome Convention was to guarantee that the European markets had markets for their 
products.
389
  Perhaps, this explains why the EU exhibited the political will needed to 
continuously justify this trade relationship to the WTO. However, within the present day 
global economy, where EU is seeking closer economic ties with other countries such as 
Brazil and India, this is no longer a concern.
390
  
In addition to this, irrespective of the outcome of the Doha Development round, the 
commercial value of trade preferences is becoming exceedingly limited as the push for 
multilateral trade liberalization continues. Should globalization facilitate the complete 
elimination of barriers to trade, these preferences would then have absolutely no commercial 
value, given that the appeal of a preference lies in the fact that it is available to few.  
Furthermore, in recent times it has been noted that there is a tendency for developing 
countries to be over-dependent on non-reciprocal preferences and thus „became trapped by 
the nature of the system‟.
391
 The structural dependence on non-reciprocal preferences 
substantiates the proposition that they have become exaggerated. Instead of being viewed as 
opportunities for developing countries, they are now being pursued as ends in themselves. 
This disregards the fact that preferences will not necessarily translate into practical gains.  A 
lesson clearly exhibited by the failure of the Lome preferences to improve the circumstances 
of the ACP countries.  
A warning against placing too much importance on non-reciprocal trade preferences 
was issued as early on as 1985 in the Leutwiler Report. It stated that  
„….For greater emphasis should be placed on permitting and encouraging 
developing countries to take advantage of their competitive strengths and on 





While developing countries continue to approach reciprocity with extreme hesitation 
it is important to bear in mind that the longer they procrastinate, the longer the benefits of 
trade liberalization will be eluded. In this regard the World Bank has also stated that  
„long term competitiveness and sustainable development cannot be built solely 
upon special preferences allowing SSA [Sub-Saharan African] countries  to 
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benefit from transient distortions in world trade policies. Adjustment to 
preference erosion is going to be necessary sooner or later in any case.‟
393
 
In light of this, the focus should not be on evading reciprocity. While allowing for 
asymmetries within trade relations the focus should be on ensuring that there is sufficient 
provision of financial and technical support and that furthermore these form part of legally 
binding obligations. It is important to highlight that this suggestion does not negate the 
importance of SDT provisions; it rather challenges the infallibility of non-reciprocity. A 
caveat though should be issued in this regard. This suggestion is levelled at developing 
countries. The nonreciprocal preferences that are offered to LDC in light of their dire 
economic and development levels are excluded from this discussion. 
What has emerged from this discussion is that the introduction of reciprocity by the 
EPAs will have negative consequences for RI vis a vis development efforts of SACU and 
SADC.  However the admittedly onerous adjustment costs would be a consequence of having 
ascribed to a global system which prioritizes trade liberalization.  
It is therefore tentatively suggested that it would be prudent for such a transition to 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The central thrust of this paper argued that the most negative consequences of 
Economic Partnership Agreements will reverberate though the regional integration efforts of 
SACU and SADC.  
 
In developing this argument, the following main themes arose.  
 
6.1 The significance of regional integration within SACU and SADC 
The advantages of regional integration discussed earlier in this paper have led many 
developing countries to adopt RI as an economic tool. Within an African context, the allure 
of RI was burgeoned by the Pan-African philosophy. This historical context, to some degree 
explains the continent‟s penchant for regional integration.  Despite much enthusiasm, 
Africa‟s experience with regional integration has been found wanting. This has however not 
deterred African leaders from  turning to regional integration as the „trump card‟ in their 
efforts towards the economic liberation of the continent. SACU represents the highest level of 
integration within the SSA region. It is a functioning customs union with a CET, and a 
combined revenue pool.  In addition to this, the organization encompasses a Common 
Monetary Area between Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa. This is an achievement 
particularly within a region which is fraught with examples of failed integration schemes. 
This high level of integration furthermore raises the possibility of SACU serving as a basis 
for RI within the larger SADC area. Over and above this, the organization has laid down legal 
commitments within the SACU agreement which lay the ground work for more intensive 
integration efforts.  
 
 SADC has taken significant steps towards advancing its RI agenda. The establishment of its 











FTA, and the consequent tariff liberalization that has taken place displays that the intention to 
establish a customs union, though ambitious, undertaken seriously   
 
 
6.2 The imperative to establish a WTO compliant regime  
There is an undeniable need for the ACP countries to establish a WTO compatible trading 
relationship with the EU. This requires restructuring the basis of the trade relationship from 
the non-reciprocal preferential access granted under the Lome Conventions. This need to 
restructure the relationship exists despite the fact that many of the ACP countries are 
developing countries, or even LDCs. Though the SDT provisions are an important part of 
WTO jurisprudence, in their current form they of no avail. This is because the Lome 
Convention constitutes a discriminatory preferences regime which is incompatible with the 
WTO system as was aptly demonstrated by the Banana dispute. By investigating the various 
legal options it was found that though in principle there are alternative to the EPAs, these 
alternatives are either flawed, or the subject of protracted multi lateral negotiations. This 
therefore requires that countries as opposed to searching for mechanism to oppose the EPAs, 
find a means of making them work. 
 
6. 3 The impact that the Economic Partnership Agreements will have on Regional 
integration in SADC and SACU  
The impact that EPAs will have on RI was investigated under two headings. Analysed first 
was the splintering of SACU and SADC. This was assessed from various perspectives. 
Within SSA the EPAs have been negotiated outside of existing regional organizations. In 
addition to this they have failed to harmonize relations between the BNLS states and the 
TDCA In addition to this the EPAs have managed to exacerbate schisms between LDC and 
non-LDC countries, SACU and SADC. The negative impact that the EPAs will have in this 
regard is clear.  
It bears mention though that it would be unfair to attribute all the existing infirmities 
with regional organizations to the EPAs. There was already a thicket of challenge that the 
both SACU and SADC faced, as was demonstrated in the chapter 3.  What the EPAs have 












The impact of the Singaporean issues was then examined. The overarching criticism 
levelled against them is that their inclusion into the EPAs is incongruent to the pace of region 
integration within SACU and SADC. Negotiating with a third party prior to securing regional 
cohesion will constrain the negotiation process. Primarily because Mozambique and the BLS 
states will already have pre-existing obligations. Not only does this limit the policy space of 
SACU and SADC, but it furthermore increases the likelihood that the countries will fail to 
reach convergence in these fields.  
 
The discussion then turned to examine the effect of reciprocity on regional 
integration. The potential socio-economic consequences that would accompany trade 
liberalization have been the subject of much angst from various civil society groups. Such 
concerns are indeed warranted. This is primarily exhibited by the very real and substantial 
adjustment costs that SSA countries will have to make. However it is important to bear in 
mind that the future of non-reciprocal preferences is extremely glum. This conclusion is 
drawn to in light of the fact that not only is there no political will to pursue such preferences, 
but the effect of the multilateral trade liberalization would in any case negate their benefit. In 
recognition of this, it is suggested that the appropriate stance to take is to focus on how to 
alleviate some of the pressures that will inevitably occur, as opposed to evading them 
however a number of other issues were highlighted. Firstly, the future of trade preferences is 
extremely precarious as multi lateral trade liberalization progresses. Secondly trade 
preferences do not independently deliver benefits such as increased trade or economic 
development. They merely assist in creating a climate conducive to securing such benefits. In 
addition to this, the longer developing countries such as SSA continue to evade reciprocity; 
the benefits of trade will not be reaped. 
 
6.4 Recommendations  
In light of the above, one of the primary considerations that should be extracted from 
this dissertation is that there are no easy answers to many of the issues that have been 
addressed. The following suggestions are however tentatively offered in order to either 
prevent, or alternatively mitigate on some of the adverse effects discussed in this paper from 
being realised. 
 The SACU is currently facing an onslaught of challenges, many of which have the 











emphasised. The SACU Council of Ministers has recently announced the intention to 
„redouble their collective efforts to resolve the outstanding issues in the SADC-EC Interim 
(IEPA) and Final Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations‟.
394
 Such efforts 
should be undertaken seriously with a view to resolving the current impasse within SACU, 
bringing an end to the untenable exclusion of South Africa.  
 
For the BNLS states to have such a significant portion of government revenue 
dependent on external customs union is neither a desirable or sustainable situation. The need 
for the BNLS states, but more particularly Swaziland and Lesotho, to diversify their income 
basis is of critical importance. Even if South Africa does continue, to contribute significantly 
through the revenue sharing formula, all indications point towards the fact this will not take 
place at the  levels that the states have became accustomed to. One possible option is that the 
BNLS states should ensure that seek technical assistance to enable them to strengthen, among 
others, tax collection mechanism. 
 
Although South Africa‟s economic policy looking outwards, as it aims to woo 
economic partners from a wider spectrum, regional realities cannot be ignored.  The 
economies of Southern Africa are intricately linked consequently „South Africa‟s stability 
and development cannot, for example, be promoted if surrounded by a regional sea of 
instability and squalor‟
395
. It is therefore also important for South Africa‟s interests to see to 
the development of the neighbouring countries.  
 
Within the SADC EPA configuration, as negotiations continue towards the conclusion 
of a full EPA, much greater emphasis should be placed on securing all necessary funding to 
assist countries in countering the negative effects of trade liberalization. The ACP countries 
should lobby for more financial assistance in terms of the 10
th
 European Development Fund. 
In addition to this ACP countries should lobby the World Bank and International Monetary  
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Additionally the ACP group should continue in its efforts to lobby for inclusion of 
SDT in Article XXIV. This should however be done mindful of the limitations of non-























































WTO Agreements  
Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participating of 
Developing Countries Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903 
General Agreement on Trade in Services LT/urA-15/s/1 15 April 1994 
General Agreement on Trade in Terms 1947 LT/UR-A-1A/1GATT1, 15 APRIL 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade. Organization, LT/UR/A/2, 15 April 
1994 
Treaties  
Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part - 
Protocol 1 concerning the definition of the concept of 'originating products' and methods of 
administrative cooperation - Protocol 2 on mutual administrative assistance in customs 
matters - Final Act – Declarations L311 04/12/1999 3 
Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between the SADC EPA states, on the one part, 
and the European Community and its member states, on the other part L319 04/12.2009 3 
Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States of the one part, and the European Community and its member states L209 11/08/2005 
27 
The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (1991)30 ILM 1241  
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 24/12/2002 C35231/33 
available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf  
Declarations  
Doha Ministerial Declaration Ministerial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001 
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1), 
 
Regional Agreements and Declarations 
SACU 1910 Agreement 
SACU 1969 Agreement 











Sirte Declaration, 1999 
SADC Trade Protocol, 2002  
Secondary Sources  
Journals 
Alden Cand Soko M „South Africa‟s economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its 
discontent‟ (2005) 43 3 Journal of Modern African Studies 367 at 371   Available online: 
http://journals.cambridge.org  [accessed 5
th
 May 2009]. 
 Borrman A and Busee M  „EU/ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Impact, Options and 
Prerequisites‟ (2005) 40  3 Intereconomics 169 available online at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/u0m748h787737202/fulltext.pdf [accessed 28 
November 2009]. 
Katembo G „Pan Africanism and Development :The East African Community Model‟ (2008) 
2 4 Journal of Pan African Studies 107  
 Krueger A „Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-Liberalizing or Protectionist‟ 
(1999) 13 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives 105 
Mukamunana R and Moeti K „Challenges of regional integration in Africa: Policy and 
administrative implications‟ 2005 Journal of Public Administration 90 at 91 available online 
at 
http://repository.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/4746/1/Mukamunana_Challenges%282005
%29.pdf [accessed 28 November 2009]. 
Ochieng   C „EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements  and the Development question: 
Which way now?‟ (2007) 2  Journal of International Economic Law10 363  available online 
at http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002203/index.php  [accessed 1
st
 t May 2009]. 
 Soko M „Regionalism and the WTO: opportunities and dangers for Africa ‟ (2004) 11 2 
South African Journal of International Affairs 31 
Walker A „The EU SADC EPA: the moment of truth for regional integration‟ (2009) 8 
6Trade Negotiations Insights 2 Available online at http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/52416/ 
[accessed 4 December 2009 
Books  
 Bosl A,  Breytenbach W, Hartzenberg T,  McCarthy C,  Schade  K Monitoring Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa yearbook Volume 4 2004 Trade Law Center for Southern 
Africa, Stellenbosch 2004  
 
Bosl A,  Breytenbach W, Hartzenberg T,  McCarthy C,  Schade  Monitoring Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa yearbook Volume 5 2005 Trade Law Center for Southern 












Bosl A,  Breytenbach W, Hartzenberg T,  McCarthy C,  Schade  Monitoring Regional 
Integration in Southern Africa yearbook Volume 6 2006  
Cassim R, Grant C, Hartzenberg T, Keeton L, Mandina C, Naumann E, Ng‟ong‟ola C,  
Sundrey R, Znamwe G The WTO an African perspective, more than a decade later  Trade 
Law Center for Southern Africa, Stellenbosch, 2009 
 Mathis J ‘Regional Trade Agreement in the GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and the internal trade 
requirement’ (2002) TMC Asser Press, The Hague Netherlands 
Mutai  H Compliance with international trade obligations, The Common Market for Eastern 
Africa (2007) Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands   
 Simon L, Bryan M, Davis A „World Trade Law: Texts, Materials, and Commentary’ Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, and Portland Oregon 2008 
Policy documents  
Bilal S and Rampa „Alternative (to) EPAs. Possible scenarios for the future ACP trade 




e65/ef21975bac4deaadc1257115004cd88a?OpenDocument [accessed 30 October 2009]. 
Bilal S„Concluding EPA Negotiations Legal and institutional issues‟ 49 ECDPM Policy 
Management Report 12 available online at www.ecdpm.org/pmr12 [accessed 22 October 
2009].  
Draper P, Halleson D, Alves P „SACU , Regional Integration and the overlap issue in 
Southern African Trade Policy Report no 15 available online at 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/D9DA3E58E0145FD8C
125730C003BB642/$FILE/SADC%20EPA%20Paper%20Peter%20Draper%20'From%20Sp
aghetti%20to%20Cannelloni'..pdf [accessed 22 October 2009].  
Economic Commission for Africa „Assessing Regional Integration in Africa: rationalizing 
Regional Economic Communities‟ 21 available online at  
http://knowledge.uneca.org/member-states/observatory-on-regional-integration/aria-
assessing-regional-integration-in-africa/aria-assessing-regional-integration-in-africa 
[accessed 22 October 2009]. 
European Center for Development and Policy Management „The interim Economic 
Partnership Agreements between the EU and the African states: contents, challenges, and 
prospects‟ 14 available online at 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index2?readform&http://











Hartzenburg T „Global governance and regionalism: A Southern (SACU) African 
perspective‟ 2006 Latin American Trade Network Working Paper 61   available online at 
http://www.latn.org.ar/archivos/documentacion/PAPER_DOC61_WP_Hartzenberg_Global%
20governance%20and%20regionalism.pdf [accessed 10 January 2010]. 
Lang, R. (2006), Renegotiating GATT Article XXIV – a priority for African countries 
Laporte G„The Cotonou Partnership Agreement: What role in a changing world? Reflections 
on the future of ACP-EU relations‟ 22 ECDPM Policy Management Report 13 available at  
www.ecdpm.org/pmr13 [accessed 14 November 2009]. 
Leshaba M„A critical analysis of Africa‟s efforts at regional integration‟ Center for Policy 
Studies Policy Briefing 30 
 Onguglo B and Ito T„How to make EPAs WTO compatible? Reforming the rules on regional 
trade agreements‟ Discussion Paper No. 40 available online at  
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/vwPrint/04BE83528CC369
ADC1256DA4004AD303?Opendocument [accessed 7 October 2009]. 
Radelet S „Regional integration and Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Are Formal Trade 
Agreements the Right Strategy?‟ 1999 20 African Economic Policy paper . Harvard Institute 
for International Development 
 Sutherland P„The future of the WTO: addressing the institutional challenges in a new 
millennium‟ 21Report by the Consultative Board to the former Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpakdi available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.htm [accessed 15 July 2010]. 
 
Electronic Resources  
AllAfrica.Com „Economic Partnership Agreements And Preferential Treatment‟ 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200712180472.html [accessed 10 January 2009] 
Borrmann A and Busse M „The institutional challenges of the EU/ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreements‟  8 available online at 
http://www.fes.de/aktuell/focus_europa/4/Docs/FES_HWWA_Institutional_Challenge_EPA.
pdf   [accessed 13
th
 May 2009 
CONCORD Cotonou Working Group „Initialling, notifying, signing, ratifying and giving 
assent or  the complexity of concluding EPAs‟ available online at 
www.concordeurope.org/Files/media/internetdocumentsENG/4_Publications/3_CONCORDs
_positions_and_studies/.../EPA-ENG.doc [accessed 25th May 2009].  
Curran L „The Economic Partnership Agreements: Rationale, Misconceptions, and non-trade 













Draper P „Bigger SACU could lead the way‟  Available online: 
http://www.saiia.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:biggersacuco
uldleadtheway&catid=67:development-through-trade-opinion&Itemid=204 [accessed 20 
April 2009]. 
Draper P and Khumalo n„The future of the Southern African Customs Union‟ available 
online 
http://www.saiia.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1102&Itemid=20
4 [accessed 22 October 2009]. 
Erasmus G„Variable Geometry, South-South Solidarity and Regional Integration: New 
Themes and old Agendas‟ 
http://www.tralac.org/cgibin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&news_id=75314&cause_i
d=1694 available online  [accessed 17 February 2010]. 
European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repositroy/Communication_on_Regional_Integration
_COM-2008-604_EN.pdf [accessed 22 October 2009]. 
European Commission on Trade „Generalised System of Preferences‟  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/ 
[accessed 20 January 2010].  
European Union „Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP 
countries on the eve of the 21st century: Challenges and options for a new partnership‟ 
Chapter 3 available online at http://europa.eu/documentation/official-docs/green-
papers/index_en.htm [accessed 7 October 2009]. 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nation „Legal aspects of regional 
integration‟ available online at http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/y4793e/y4793e0a.htm#bm10 
[accessed 18 October 2009].  
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations „Executive summary on regional 
integration‟ 4 available online at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/004/Y4793E/y4793e03.htm 
[accessed  18 October 2009].   
 Ghosh J „North-South RTAs reinforce existing inequalities‟ available online at 
http://www.centad.org/focus_27.asp [accessed 3 January 2010]. 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting „SADC split over Zimbabwe‟ available online 
http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/RMOI-7L635J?OpenDocument. [accessed 
10 January 2010] 
International Security Studies „SADC RISDP‟ 
http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/sadc/risdp/c2.pdf available online 











Jakobeit C, Hartzenberg T and Charalambides N „Overlapping membership in COMESA, 
EAC, SACU and SADC; trade policy options for the region and EPA negotiations 38 EPA 
available online at http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-epa-overlapping-memberships-
2005.pdf [accessed 15 May 2009] 
 
 Karingi Kand  Lang R „Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-ACP Africa Economic 
Partnership Agreement‟ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2.avaialble online 
www.uneca.org/atpc/Work%20in%20progress/10.pdf [accessed 22 October 2009] 
Keet D„The implications of the EU‟s proposed „Regional Economic Partnership Agreements‟ 
with respect to regional integration and development in Southern Africa‟ 16 available online 




Le Roux Mathabo„Southern Africa: Threat of Regional Upheaval If SA Torpedoes Customs 
Union‟ 
Lee M„Regionalism in Africa: A part of the problem or part of the solution?‟1  available 
online at http://www.polis.sciencespobordeaux.fr/vol10ns/lee.pdf [accessed 18 October 
2009].  
Mabola B „SADC launches Free Trade Area‟ available online at 
http://www.southafrica.info/africa/sadc-fta.htm [ accessed 22 May 2009] 
Manners P and Behar „A World Development Report „Trade within Sub-Saharan countries, 




 May 2009]. 
Mathews C„SACU transfers cut a blow for South Africa‟s neighbouring states‟ 
http://www.tralac.org/cgi-
bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&news_id=82401&cause_id=1694 [accessed 22 
October 2009]. 
Mbaye S „Sub-Saharan Africa‟s leadership to nowhere‟ Project Syndicate 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/mbaye6 [accessed 7 October 2009]. 
McCarthy C „Monetary Integration in Africa (IV)‟ http://www.tralac.org/cgi-
bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=1694&news_id=78723&cat_id=0 
[accessed 7 February 2010] 
Michalopoulos C„Trade and Development in GATT and WTO: The role of Special and 
Differential Treatment for Developing countries‟ 15 available online at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/8258261111405593654/20432097/Tradeanddev
elopmentintheGATTandWTO.pdf [accessed 10 January 2009].   
NAMIBIA: UN country office supports bid for "LDC-like" 











Regional Trade Facilitation Program „Tripartite talks set new trade path‟ available online at 
http://www.rtfp.org/news.php?id=78  accessed 22 May 2009. 
Roux W „An alternative to the EPAs proposal a provision dropped form the EU‟s EPA 
negotiation manual paper‟ 7 
http://www.vcsv.co.za/unique/tralac/pdf/20051018tralac_speech_final.pdf [accessed 10 
January 2009].  
SACU „Trade Negotiations‟ available online 
http://www.sacu.int/traden.php?include=about/traden/multilateral.html [accessed 10 January 
2010].  
SACU Press Statement „Outcome of the Special SACU Council of Ministers Meeting held on 
17 September 2009 in Ezulwini Swaziland‟ 2 available online at 
http://www.sacu.int/docs/pr/2009/pr0917.pdf [accessed 22 October 2009]. 
SADC EPA Group - EC Negotiations: Assessing the Emerging Outcome available online at 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/parlimentary/EPAoutcomes.pdf [accessed 25th May 2009] . 
Schillinger H „Revisiting regionalism in Southern Africa‟ 11 available online at 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/namibia/05258.pdf [accessed 21 January 2010].  
 Soko M „The political economy of regional integration in Southern Africa‟ 14 Available 
online:  www.notre-europe.eu [accessed 20 April 2009]  
The European Commission „Overview of the EU-ACP Partnership Agreement‟ available 
online at http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm [accessed 10th  
May 2009 
The Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states „The ACP group‟ 
available online at: http://www.acpsec.org/en/about_us.htm  [accessed 20 May 2009]. 





 May 2009]  
TRALAC „The interim SADC EPA Agreement: Legal and Technical issues and challenges 





Meeting_Sept09.pdf [accessed 10 January 2010]. 
TRLAC „Post conference report‟ 
http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1694/tralac_Annual_conference_Report_20091007.
pdf  [accessed 3
rd











World Trade Organization „the WTO to continue work on the harmonization of rules of 
origin‟ http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr106_e.htm [accessed 3o November 
2009 
WTO „Continued economic reforms would attract more foreign investment‟ Trade Policy 
Review 2003 available online at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/tpr_e/tp213_e.htm 
[accessed 10 January 2010]. 
WTO „Understanding the WTO: Principles of the trading system‟ available online 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm [accessed 17 September 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
